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1. Introduction	
 
Venture capital is a possible financing form for start-up firms and entrepreneurs that need 
financial funding. There is hardly any information about venture capital in Austria, although 
there already is limited literature on venture capital in Europe. Most of academic literature 
available is from the United States, where venture capital is more popular. 
The purpose of this thesis is to get an overview of venture capital deals and its characteristics 
in Austria. I want to observe if venture capital deals in Austria have an impact on the 
performance of the firms that received the invested capital. Furthermore, I look at the 
different factors that may influence this relationship.  
This thesis consists of a theoretical and an empirical part. Venture capital is still better 
established in the United States than in Europe. Therefore the theoretical part of this study is 
based on international literature. This way the reader gets a broader impression of this 
financing form. The information derived can be compared with the actual situation in Austria 
in the empirical part. 
The theoretical part begins with chapter two, in which I explain the term venture capital and 
go through the different steps of the investment process. The aim of this chapter is defining 
venture capital and getting an impression of how the investment itself works. The 
understanding of this fundamental process is very important in order to be able explaining the 
consequences this financing form implicates. Another part of this chapter is the explanation of 
the different exit strategies which will become important in the empirical part. I define the 
various possibilities of exiting the investment and point out which ramifications it has for the 
investor as well as for the entrepreneur. The choice of the exit strategy already gives a clue at 
the firm performance. In addition to that I shortly write about the situation of venture capital 
in Europe. 
The third chapter deals with agency problems that can occur within the investment process. I 
listed and explained the most common ones that venture capital deals entail. As always there 
arise different conflicts between the various parties involved in the investment process. A 
short overview of these problems is essential as I will discuss strategies to mitigate them later 
in chapter four. My aim is it to find out if these possible solutions help improving the 
performance of venture capital-backed firms. A big part of this chapter is dedicated to staging 
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and syndication, two strategies to mitigate agency problems. It is one of the most important 
aims of this thesis to find the reasons for choosing these strategies and consequently analyze 
the real impact of them on venture capital deals in Austria. 
This leads me to the empirical part in chapter five. Based on data of Venture Source I 
analyzed venture capital deals in Austria. As already mentioned, I compared the findings of 
the theoretical part with the results of my empirical study. Therefore, I developed some 
hypotheses based on the international literature. With the help of my empirical study I 
confirmed or neglected them. The interesting point here is that international effects are 
compared with Austrian so that it becomes clear if the investment behavior and the 
consequences of venture capital are different for Austria. First, I generally analyzed venture 
capital in Austria with the help of some descriptive statistics. Secondly, I showed and tested 
the impact of venture capital on the performance of venture-capital backed firms. I analyzed 
relationships between different factors and the firm performance. The greatest part of this 
study is the analysis of the impact of staging and syndication on firm performance. My results 
show that the situation in Austria basically applies to the common opinions in my theoretical 
part, although there are some points in which I had to neglect my hypotheses.  
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2. Venture	Capital	
 
Venture capital is a very important source of supporting start-up firms and entrepreneurs that 
need financial funding. In fact, it is not the most prominent form of providing financial capital 
as many young firms decide to rather consult banks or private investors, which includes 
friends and family members. Sometimes they even choose entering the public market without 
ever having asked for financing before.1 Some firms do not have the option of receiving 
money from banks due to a lack of securities. Especially start-up firms do not have the hard 
assets required. Because of the high risk, banks will refuse investing money into the project. 
The same is true for investment banks and public equity. There are regulations that prohibit 
entering the public market when the sales are not high enough. At this point venture capital 
firms can be considered as a possible alternative.2  
Venture capital is usually offered to small businesses in order to finance their start-up or their 
expansion. In the case of a management buyout or buy-in, also larger companies can receive 
support. The money can be provided by either an individual, as for example a business angel, 
or by an organization, a venture capital firm. These providers are specialized on high-risk and 
high-growth firms. The particular feature of venture capitalists is that they do not simply 
invest capital. They also advise the management and monitor it. In addition, they can facilitate 
the access to networks including lawyers, accountants, investment bankers and other 
important people in the sector the company is performing in. In return for this investment and 
support they receive equity of the company and are represented on the board of directors.3 
Therefore, venture capitalists are cooperating with the firm, but also with external investors 
that put their money into the fund. Venture capital is often a form of limited partnership, 
which means that there are limited and general partners. The limited partners are presented by 
the outside investors that invest in funds of general partners, the venture capitalists.4 Limited 
partners are for example banks, insurance companies or pension funds. They have rights 
resulting of the partnership but also a limited liability of the management of the fund. The 
general partner is responsible for the management of the fund as he bears the full liability. To 
                                                 
1 Amit, Brandner & Zott (1998), pp. 442-443 
2 Zider (1998), pp. 132-133 
3 Coyle (2000), pp. 2-3, Sorensen (2007), p. 2725, Cumming & Johan (2009), p. 5 
4 Sahlman (1990), pp. 473-488 
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sum up, the venture capitalist is an intermediary between the entrepreneur who needs 
financing and the external investors who put money into the venture capital fund.5 
The typical venture-capital firm creates its portfolio of ventures or investments within the first 
three to five years of a fund. After this investment stage they tend not to select more new 
ventures. They try to make cash out of the already existing investments, which is divided 
among the limited partners afterwards. After the allocation of the money, a new fund is raised. 
In most cases, the venture-capital firm invests several times during the venture’s life cycle 
into a company, depending on its need of additional capital. 6  
 
2.1 Venture’s	Life	Cycle	
 
Entrepreneurs go through different stages associated with various sources of financial capital 
in their venture life cycle7.  
 
Figure 1: Venture's Life Cycle8  
 
At the beginning, the entrepreneur finds itself in the development stage, which is also called 
seed stage. At this point, he develops a business plan by creating a strategy. The name “seed 
stage” is derived from seed financing, which consists of funds that help the entrepreneur to 
get an impression whether his idea will be successful or not. The most prominent form of 
financing in this stage is the use of private money, but also friends’ and family members’ 
                                                 
5 Cumming & Johan (2009), p. 4 
6 Sahlman (1990), pp. 488-503 
7 Leach & Melicher (2011), p. 29 
8 Based on Leach & Melicher (2011), p. 24 
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support plays an important role. It is not very common that business angels or venture 
capitalists invest in such an early stage. 9 
When a firm enters the second stage of the venture’s life cycle, the so-called startup stage, it 
has already developed a business plan, has a management team and has set its first financial 
statement. At best, it has already generated its first profits. The firm has already taken the 
initial step of developing a feasible strategy. Startup financing should help implementing this 
strategy through production and sales. For this purpose the entrepreneur’s private capital and 
the money of his friends and family may not suffice and the firm will need to consider 
attracting external investors. Especially because at this point the cash outflows are often much 
higher than the inflows, firms will be dependent on external equity financing. The financial 
source in this stage is venture capital. This money can be provided by either business angels – 
individuals that invest into small businesses - or venture capitalists.10 
In the next stage, the survival stage, the entrepreneur will find out whether the venture is 
successful or not. At this point the external equity financing is called first-round financing. 
This money should be used for commercializing the innovation when there is lack of cash. 
There are various possibilities for investors. An important financing source are suppliers and 
customers. They can be asked for trade credit - capital provided by suppliers in the form of 
granting a deferred payment - and accelerated payment incomes. Additionally, there exists 
financial assistance of governments for small businesses in form of loans at lower interest 
rates and tax shelters. At this stage, even banks become possible capital providers although 
this source needs securities. Therefore, ventures are more likely to obtain debt financing from 
banks later on in their venture’s life cycle. Of course, also venture capitalists and business 
angels remain as investors.11 Actually, venture capital firms do not tend to invest frequently 
into start-up companies. They prefer entering after the first stages when the basic idea already 
has been developed and the company or the entrepreneur begins to commercialize it. 
Furthermore, they try to avoid investing into projects in later stages, when the likeability of 
decreasing growth rates due to competition and other factors increases.12  
In the rapid-growth stage, revenues and cash inflows increase faster than expenses which 
results in a positive value. But the sudden rise in revenues can also imply an increase in 
inventory expenses and accounts receivables. Consequently, external financing is needed. 
                                                 
9 Leach & Melicher (2011), pp. 23-29 
10 Leach & Melicher (2011), pp. 25-29 
11 Leach & Melicher (2011), p. 26 
12 Zider (1998), p. 132 
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Here, the most important financial sources are suppliers and customers, commercial banks, 
business operations and investment bankers. The second-round financing takes place in the 
rapid-growth stage and is usually realized through venture capital. Mezzanine financing and 
liquidity- stage financing are other common forms in this stage.13  
The last stage of the venture’s life cycle is the early-maturity stage which is defined by a 
continuing but slower growth of revenues than before. At this moment, the exit strategy is 
decided (see chapter 2.3). In general, an exit can be realized through sale or merger, but of 
course there is the possibility of continuing and therefore extending the maturity stage. At this 
point, external financing is not that essential as before. The venture can offer seasoned 
securities to the public, if it already issued publicly traded securities before. 14 
 
2.2 The	Investment	Process	
 
The investment process of venture capitalists in total consists of seven steps15: 
1. Due diligence 
2. Selection of a stage and an industry 
3. Staging 
4. Valuation 
5. Syndication 
6. Board seats 
7. Contract creation 
The starting point is the due diligence in which the venture capitalist reads up on several 
potential entrepreneurial firms and decides which of them are worth investing in.16 Due 
diligence is the process of screening the potential firms so that the investors have more 
reliable information about them. To this end, they examine for example reports and contracts 
very carefully. 
After the screening of firms, the venture capitalist has to choose the stage in which he is going 
to enter the investment, but as well the industry. Venture capital plays a big role in the start-up 
                                                 
13 Leach & Melicher (2011), pp. 22-27 
14 Leach & Melicher (2011), pp. 22-29 
15 Cumming & Johan (2009), p.283 
16 Cumming & Johan (2009), p. 283 
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and rapid-growth stage of the venture’s life cycle. They do not only prefer certain stages of 
investments, but also specific industries, as for example companies in the IT or the 
biotechnological branch. Of course, this differs from investor to investor.17 Usually, it is 
written down in the contract of a venture capital fund in which stage and industry they invest 
in. The final decision may vary due to changes in the market. 18  The decision for a certain 
stage can depend on the stock market and the IPO market which is connected to their exit 
strategy (see chapter 2.3). The liquidity risk is defined by “the risk of not being able to 
effectively exit”, which implies that the exit will be postponed or that the shares have to be 
sold at lower prices. When the liquidity risk of exit markets is high, venture capitalists tend to 
invest in “high-tech and early-stage projects” with the aim of delaying the exit requests. On 
the contrary, they decide to invest into more proceeded ventures when the exit market is 
liquid so that they can take advantage of it.19 
The next possible step in the investment process is staging. Staging allows the venture 
capitalist to minimize its risks and to enhance monitoring. The total amount of money is not 
provided in advance, but in stages. The venture capitalist and the entrepreneur will agree on 
benchmarks which have to be met in order to receive the next stage of financing. For the case 
that the firm is not able to fulfill the expected criterions, a recalculation and increased 
monitoring are probable. This strategy can avoid losses. Compared to upfront financing, 
staged financing increases profits of promising entrepreneurial firms. In the case of less 
promising firms, venture capitalist could underinvest in the initial stages which can imply 
losses in the further process. Most entrepreneurs agree to stage financing because they are 
convinced that they will be able to meet all the criterions. Staging is also linked to agency 
problems (see chapter 4).20 
Another very important point in the investment process of a venture capitalist is the valuation. 
The venture capitalist has to make his own calculations oft the true value of the investment, as 
many entrepreneurs are asking for too much or too little money.21 The valuation can underlie 
fluctuations as the pricing is closely related to the public market cycles. If new money is 
available in the funds, the calculated value can be too low.22 
                                                 
17 Sahlman (1990), p. 489 
18 Cumming & Johan (2009), p. 285-286  
19 Cumming, Fleming, & Schwienbacher (2005), pp. 77-78 
20 Cumming & Johan (2009), pp. 286-287; Wang & Zhou (2004), p. 132; Sahlman (1990), p. 507 
21 Cumming & Johan (2009), p. 288 
22 Gompers & Lerner (2000), p. 281 
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Often venture capitalists decide to syndicate because it improves decision-making due to the 
availability of a second. Furthermore, it improves the possibilities of diversification, since the 
risk and possible losses can be divided between the syndicating investors. Chapter 4 will show 
that it can also be a measure to mitigate agency problems.23  
As mentioned before, venture capitalists typically receive a seat on the board of directors in 
return for their investment. This allows them to monitor and control the firm, and thus, to 
protect their invested capital. 24 The board membership depends on the stage of financing, on 
CEO turnovers and on the required grade of monitoring.25 Usually, the venture capitalist does 
not receive any compensation in form of cash for his board ownership.26  
The final step in the financing process is the creation of the contract. In most cases, there are 
different types of contracts: a term sheet, a shareholder agreement and a subscription 
agreement. The term sheet deals with the expected conditions of the relationship and 
cooperation between the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist. It provides the basis for 
further work of lawyers on the final contract, which then is binding in contrast to the term 
sheet. The shareholder agreement refers to the final contract between the shareholders of the 
company that includes the venture capitalist. This agreement is legally binding. The 
subscription agreement is the final contract between the venture capitalist and the 
entrepreneur. It regulates the subscription of the shares.27 
 
2.3 Exit	strategies			
 
The last stage in which the venture capitalist is involved is the exit. Exit stands for the sale of 
the shares of the venture capitalist so that the firm becomes independent of the investor.28  
Venture capital is not a long-term financing form as the investments normally only last for 
two to six years. In the case of a limited partnership this time span prolongs to ten years and 
there is even the option to extend by a further three years. At the moment the investment is 
                                                 
23 Cumming & Johan (2009), pp. 289-290 
24 Cumming & Johan (2009), p. 291 
25 Lerner (1995), pp. 301-318 
26 Sahlman (1990), p. 506 
27 Cumming & Johan (2009), p. 292 
28 Schwienbacher (2010), p. 389 
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made, the venture capitalist already accounts for the gains resulting of the exit event.29 
Therefore, investors include the possible exit strategies into the due diligence process prior to 
the investment decision. The outcome can be used to estimate the actual value and the quality 
of the investment.30 
The exit is of great importance for the investor because the value of the deal is basically the 
value of the exit. In return for investing into the company, the venture capitalists receive 
equity. To receive the money they have to sell their shares, especially when taking into 
account that they will not receive any dividends before. The sale of the shares is the exit of the 
investor because he is not the owner of the company anymore. This is the only possibility for 
the venture capitalist to get the return out of the investment. There are two important points 
concerning the exit: the type and the timing. In this thesis, I will only look at the type of exit 
as the timing is not relevant for this study.31  
There are several possibilities how an investor can exit the venture. Basically, there are five 
types of exit: Initial Public Offering, trade sale, management buy-out, refinancing and 
liquidation. The different exit types have different consequences for both parties. This has 
already during the negotiations an influence on the financing conditions and the allocation of 
control rights.  
 
2.3.1 Initial	Public	Offering	
 
An exit through an initial public offering (IPO) is only possible if the company fulfills the 
prerequisites for a stock market listing. The requirements vary from stock exchange to stock 
exchange. Usually there are a required minimum number of publicly traded shares, total 
market value, stock price, and shareholders.32 In Austria, at the Wiener Börse the 
requirements are a total nominal amount of 2.9 million Euros, a minimum of 10.000 shares 
and public free float of 275,000 Euros.33 
The venture capitalist can list his private shares so that they are converted into public ones. 
For the investor this signifies that he can sell his shares at the market price. For that reason 
                                                 
29 Cumming & Johan (2009), p. 5 
30 Schwienbacher (2010), p. 389-390 
31 Schwienbacher (2010), pp. 389-390 
32 Listing and Delisting Requirements 
33 Zulassung bzw. Einbeziehung 
12 
 
this exit strategy is regarded as the most promising one for venture capitalists. But this exit 
route has also advantages for the firm going public. Its image will be improved and there will 
be new possibilities of getting financed. A very important advantage, especially if compared 
with trade sale, is that the entrepreneur is very likely to remain having the control over his 
firm when offering the shares for the first time. Afterwards, he can lose this control. 
Furthermore, an IPO can motivate the employees and the management. Unfortunately, there 
are also disadvantages as for example the costs involved.34 
 
2.3.2 Trade	Sale	
 
Trade sale is another denomination for acquisition. It means that the company is bought by 
another firm. The venture capitalists receive cash in return for the sale. The big difference to 
an IPO is that the company does not have to meet any public prerequisites.35  
For the entrepreneur an acquisition or a merger has one big drawback: The buyer will try to 
gain the control of the company so that the entrepreneur suffers a loss. The ownership is 
newly structured.36  
A trade sale can also signify an exchange of shares. In this case the venture capitalists receive 
shares of a less risky company in return for the shares of the firm he wants to exit.37  
 
2.3.3 Management	Buyout	and	Refinancing	
 
A management buyout is also called repurchase. Here the entrepreneur buys back the shares 
of the venture capitalist. Refinancing, also called secondary sale, is defined by the purchase of 
the shares by a new institutional investor.38 The difference between a refinancing and an 
                                                 
34 Schwienbacher (2010), pp. 393-395, Schwienbacher (2005), p.4 
35 Schwienbacher (2010), pp. 395-396 
36 Schwienbacher (2010), p. 396 
37 Schwienbacher (2010), p. 396 
38 Schwienbacher (2010), p. 396 
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acquisition is that only the shares of the investors are sold. In an acquisition also those of the 
entrepreneur and all the other shareholders are part of the offered package.39 
Both strategies are criticized by Schwienbacher40 as being only partial exits. Venture 
Capitalists usually tend to keep a part of their shares in order to proof that the firm has some 
standard of quality. The problem with these exit types is that they are mostly chosen when the 
firms did not meet the expected growth rates. Consequently, the investors would get rather 
low returns. Cumming and MacIntosh41 disagree partially. They have the same opinion about 
secondary sales but they point out that repurchases often are full exits. As the shares are 
bought back by the company itself information asymmetries do not occur and the help of the 
investors is not needed anymore. A partial exit is probable when the firm is not able to buy 
back all the shares due to a lack of resources. 
 
2.3.4 Liquidation	
 
Liquidation or write-off is of course not the desired exit route. Liquidation normally means 
that the firm failed. Again there exists the possibility of a full exit or a partial exit. In the case 
that the investors decide for a full write-off, there is no or hardly any hope left that the initial 
investment of the venture capitalists will be returned. When the investors write-off partially, 
they think that the firm still has some value left but not enough to engage as before. This is a 
clear signal for the missing quality of the project.42  
  
                                                 
39 Cumming & MacIntosh (2003), p. 514 
40 Schwienbacher (2010), p. 396 
41 Cumming & MacIntosh (2003), p. 524 
42 Cumming & MacIntosh (2003), p. 514, p. 524 
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2.4 Venture	Capital	in	Europe	
 
Venture capital has its origin in the United States, where it still has the greatest importance all 
over the world. In contrast, the situation in Europe is different. The venture capital market in 
Europe increased over the last period of time, but European venture capital funds cannot 
compete with those in the United States up till now.43 
The main reason for the differences between these two markets can be found in the past: A 
different institutional environment and legal differences in taxes and securities implied that 
the European VC market undertook a different development than that in the U.S.44 
Figure 2 shows the venture capital investment as a percentage of the GDP of selected 
European countries, but also of the Unites States. The data45 from the year 2008 shows that 
United Kingdom has a very developed venture capital market. The same is true for Denmark. 
But also Ireland, Switzerland, France and Spain can keep up with the United States. Austria 
invested 0.03% of the GDP, which lies below the average of 0.1%. The reason for the 
differences in venture capital investments between single European countries can once more 
be found in institutional structures and tax regulations. However, looking at figure 2 gives the 
impression that Europe caught up with the United States. 46 
 
Figure 2: Venture Capital Investment as a Percentage of GDP (2008)47 
 
                                                 
43 Oehler et al. (2007), p. 7 
44 Oehler et al. (2007), p. 3 
45 OECD (2010 
46 Oehler et al. (2007), p. 5; OECD (2010) 
47 OECD (2010) 
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Nevertheless, there are differences between the investment behaviors of the two regions. 
Schwienbacher48 detected that European venture capital funds often underperform compared 
with those of the United States. There are several reasons:  
 Funds in Europe are monitored less frequently than in the U.S.  
 The European market is less liquid concerning human capital and exit routes.   
 Syndication occurs less often in Europe than in the Unites States, which implies higher 
risk. (see chapter 4) 
 In Europe the use of convertible securities is more common. 
Despite of these differences young venture capital-backed firms in Europe are very similar to 
those in the United States. If longer existing firms are compared, more differences can be 
observed. 
  
                                                 
48 Schwienbacher (2005) 
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3. Agency	problems	
 
As always when two or more parties are involved, problems and disadvantages for one or 
more parties can appear. Thus, the relationship between the entrepreneur and the venture 
capital firm is characterized by lots of agency problems. A principal-agent problem refers to 
the situation in which the principal employs an agent although there is incomplete and 
asymmetric information. Agency problems occur when the agent does not act in the interest of 
the principal. These actions against the principal can be classified into various types: moral 
hazard, adverse selection, free riding, hold-up, trilateral bargaining, window dressing, 
underinvestment, asset stripping and risk shifting. Sometimes, it is possible to avoid agency 
problems by including certain clauses in the contract. But not all agency problems occur after 
signing a contract, as for example adverse selection may be a problem before. In general, 
agency problems can be avoided or at least mitigated by three methods: screening, monitoring 
and contracting.49  
In the case of venture capital the principal-agent relationship is slightly more complex than 
usually. The venture capitalist invests money into the company or the idea of the 
entrepreneur. Additionally, he offers advices and support and even has voting rights. Seen it 
from this perspective, the venture capitalist acts for the entrepreneur and therefore he is the 
agent, while the entrepreneur is the principal. But the entrepreneur can also be in the role of 
the agent, as he has to fulfill the expectations of the principal, the venture capitalist, in order 
to receive the required capital. Of course, there are also principal-agent problems between 
external investors and venture capitalists and between different venture capitalists, but here I 
just want to focus on the relationship between the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist.50  
  
                                                 
49 Cumming & Johan (2009), p. 32-36; Kaplan & Strömberg (2001), p. 426 
50 Cumming & Johan (2009), p. 34 
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3.1 Moral	Hazard	
 
Moral hazard means that the agent feels secure because of the support of the principal and 
therefore relies on his knowledge and his skills. Consequently, the agent does not exert 
himself too much. In the case of venture capital, effort is indispensable because the 
performance of the firm depends largely on the ambitions of the entrepreneur and the venture 
capitalist. Both, the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist, start acting opportunistically with 
the result that both lose.51  
Another form of moral hazard refers to the problem of shirking. The venture capitalist is not 
able to supervise the distribution of the invested capital because the entrepreneur has more 
information about it. Consequently, the entrepreneur could retain part of the investment and 
use the money privately. In reality, he knows that there was no or less money invested into the 
project and that no or little profit will be generated. At the beginning the probability of 
success is equal for both parties, but shirking leads to an imbalance. Furthermore, the 
entrepreneur could gain privately from continuing business, which stops him from closing a 
business that does not generate profit.52 
Bilateral moral hazard or double-sided moral hazard is also very common in venture capital 
deals as both parties are agent and principal at the same time. It can arise at two points in the 
venture’s life cycle. The first one is exactly what discussed above: Both parties reconsider 
thoroughly how much effort they should invest, which is called “bilateral effort-shirking”. 
The second dangerous situation is the choice of an exit strategy. They either decide for going 
public through an IPO or one party (or even both) steals parts of the project, which is referred 
to as the “double-sided expropriation problem”. Both types of moral hazard lead to a decrease 
in value.53  
Another form is multitask moral hazard. In these situations the agent has to fulfill several 
tasks, but not all of them are in the interest of the principal. This problem arises as a venture 
capitalist has duties as an agent of various firms because he does not only invest in one single 
                                                 
51 Cumming & Johan (2009), p. 35; Elitzur & Gaviuos (2003), p. 710 
52 Bergemann & Hege (1998), p. 704-710; Wang & Zhou (2004), p. 132 
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entrepreneur. Sometimes he might be more involved in one company than in the others, 
because he expects it to generate more profit or because it needs more support.54 
 
3.2 Adverse	Selection	
 
Adverse selection already arises before the signing of the contract. The problem consists in 
the attractiveness of certain types of contracts to certain people. For instance, debt financing 
attracts other entrepreneurs than equity financing. This can be observed when there are 
differences in the risk-level or expected mean return of two firms.55  
Two firms with the same average return but different levels of risk initially have the same 
returns distribution but then it deviates due to the risk-level. The entrepreneur that is more 
risk-friendly, often called “nut” is very likely to achieve a high return, but also the probability 
of failing is very high. The risk-averse entrepreneur has a high likelihood of obtaining a rather 
low return, but it is not very likely that he will go bankrupt. The consequence of this 
divergence is that the “nut” will prefer nonconvertible debt to equity financing. A risk-
friendly investor that is successful would be better off by owning the total common equity and 
if the investor only holds nonconvertible debt. Otherwise, he would have to share the return 
with the investor. In the case of going bankrupt, the investor would have a senior right if he 
financed the entrepreneur with debt and therefore would get all the residual value. The 
entrepreneur itself only is liable for his investment and it is possible that he will soon be able 
to restart. The risk-averse entrepreneur cannot lose a lot because he is not expected to make 
great gains anyway. Therefore his opportunity costs of handing common equity to the venture 
capitalist are rather low.56  
If two firms have the same level of risk but different expected values, the situation is 
different. The entrepreneur with lower expected returns is called “lemon”. The starting point 
of their probability distribution is different, but the width is the same. Here, the lemon will 
tend to offer equity while the entrepreneur with higher expected returns prefers debt 
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55 Cumming & Johan (2009), pp. 36-37 
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financing. The reason lies in the amount of money the lemon would lose in bankruptcy if the 
venture capitalist holds debt and has senior rights to equity.57  
This points out the existence of an adverse selection problem: The offering of debt financing 
primarily attracts firms with high levels of risk, while the offering of equity financing attracts 
firms with low expected returns.58  
Also the use of high discount rates in evaluating the investment can cause adverse selection. It 
deters promising firms from asking for money of the venture capitalist and they decide to look 
for someone else. As a result, only firms without any other options are attracted by the 
venture capitalist.59  
 
3.3 Window	Dressing	
 
Window dressing describes the phenomena that someone looks better than he really is. The 
positive effects for the cheating firm are rather short-term, while the consequences for the 
betrayed party can involve high long-term costs. At the beginning, an entrepreneurial firm 
may seem to be promising leading to more capital obtained by the venture capitalist, but then 
it turns out to have a poor performance.60 
Especially stage financing motivates firms to pretend incorrect facts. The better the 
appearance of the firm, the more money they receive for the next stage. Therefore, 
entrepreneurs overstate expected sales for the next periods or cover up possible losses. The 
consequence for the venture capital firm is a decrease in payoff because of calculations based 
on wrong information.61 
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3.4 Hold‐up	problem	
 
The hold-up problem refers to the difficulties resulting from different levels of bargaining 
power of the two parties. The party that has the lower bargaining power is dependent on the 
other one, who can decide to “hold up” the weaker party.62 
The entrepreneur can be the party with higher bargaining power and therefore hold up the 
venture capitalist. This is the case if the success of the venture capital firm is dependent on the 
entrepreneur because of the large amount of money invested. Maybe this entrepreneurial firm 
is the only firm it invested in or the only one remaining profitable. This allows the 
entrepreneur to renegotiate the contract.63 
But also the venture capitalist can hold up the entrepreneur. If the entrepreneur does not 
receive money of other investors, the venture capitalist would be able to change the terms 
when entering a new financing stage. Maybe the entrepreneur is even bounded to this venture 
capitalist because of clauses in the contract. The investor, therefore, has a lot of possibilities 
to hold up the entrepreneur.64  
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4. Strategies	to	mitigate	agency	problems	
 
These agency problems have to be mitigated in some way to make venture capital more 
attractive and more promising. As mentioned before there are three typical ways to achieve 
this: screening, monitoring and contracting.65 Furthermore, I will look at staging and 
syndication in more detail.  
Avoiding adverse selection problems is indispensable in venture capital as venture capitalists 
look for high-quality firms they can invest in.66  
For each agency problem other measures must be taken. The strategies listed before are not 
efficient for all cases.  
 
4.1 Screening	
 
Screening is a method to mitigate agency problems that is realized before closing the deal. 
The venture capitalists evaluate the firm and try to analyze it very detailed. Therefore, they 
collect information about the investment project. Normally, this happens within a due 
diligence and often the relevant information can be found in the business plan. Primarily, the 
investors are interested in the attractiveness of the investment, the management of the firm 
and the contract terms. Another important point is the risk. According to Kaplan and Per 
Strömberg67 there are several factors that include risk: “market, technology, customer 
adoption, competition and, management”. They found out that uncertainty is mostly caused by 
management risk. In these cases, the investors often decide to add some team members. 
Although venture capitalists invest a lot of time in screening, they never know everything 
about the entrepreneurs they are going to invest in. Due to these information asymmetries it is 
impossible to exclude adverse selection totally from venture capital. Screening often just 
means keeping the risk at a minimum. Detecting the risk of choosing a lemon is easier for 
them than collecting information about the risk of investing in a nut. Risk is more complicated 
than low returns are. The reason is that entrepreneurs tend to deemphasize the risk of their 
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business, but also that entrepreneurs usually do not have the tendency to intentionally build up 
lemons. Furthermore, the venture capitalist can detect a lot about lemons during the due 
diligence process. Finally, it is easier for an investor to compensate for the low return of a nut 
than reducing the level of risk due to its experience.68 But venture capitalists should screen the 
company very carefully. The entrepreneur should not have the feeling that the venture 
capitalist will withhold much power. In this case, promising firms will look for another 
investor.69 
 
4.2 Monitoring	
 
 Another possibility to mitigate moral hazard is monitoring by the venture capitalist. This 
method is used after the signing of the contract. Usually, the investor has a seat on the board 
of the firm and can therefore observe what exactly the entrepreneur does. Especially when 
there is a management turnover the venture capitalist prefers adding someone to the board. A 
part of the monitoring and the collecting of information after investing is the support of the 
management. A replacement of the entrepreneur as a consequence is definitely possible. But 
most of this support takes place in terms of advises.70 Monitoring is very costly because of the 
great amount of time and effort the venture capitalist has to invest.71  
During the monitoring, the venture capitalist tends to use his control rights in order to reduce 
the private benefits of the entrepreneur. As mentioned before, going public includes some of 
these private benefits as for example keeping control over the firm. Consequently, the 
investor’s behavior reduces the probability of going public. But of course, the monitoring can 
also add value to the firm. Advices to the management should help the firm to perform better, 
and therefore, reduce the likelihood of liquidation and provide incentives to strive an IPO. 
Another possible consequence of monitoring Schwienbacher points out is that the likelihood 
of liquidation will be increased. The presence of the venture capitalists on the board of the 
firm may reduce the effort of the entrepreneur.72  
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As monitoring is more or less a fixed element of venture capital, I derived the following 
hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1: Venture capital improves the firm performance.  
Hypothesis 1a: Venture capital increases the probability of going public and decreases the 
probability of liquidation.  
One strategy that combines monitoring with the setting of incentives is staging. The 
compliance of certain requirements is necessary to obtain more capital, which entails more 
effort of the entrepreneur. In order to be able to assess if the entrepreneurs did well, the 
venture capitalist has to monitor his actions.73 As a consequence of not being successful, the 
venture capitalist can refuse investing more money into the firm and thereby warn other 
potential investors.74    
 
4.3 Contracting	
 
Contracting deals with the design of the contract between the entrepreneur and the venture 
capitalist. The investor may incorporate clauses that encourage the entrepreneur. In this way 
the venture capitalist can allocate the cash flow and control rights.75   
It is hardly possible to include a clause against moral hazard in a contract, but one can set 
incentives to make more effort. The contract could include a prohibition to continue working 
on the financed project after the expiration of the contract but for example leave it instead to 
the venture capitalist. If this clause is missing, the entrepreneur could try to attract other 
venture capitalists.76   
The effort of an agent increases with his residual claim, which is his share of earnings after all 
debt obligations have been met. The expected payoff will be divided between the two parties, 
the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist, which implies that putting effort in increasing the 
payoff always has a positive effect for the other party as well. Also the other side has to be 
noticed: If one party does not work hard enough, the company could fail although the other 
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party tries hard to avoid this. Thus, it plays a big role how the equity is shared. If the venture 
capitalist owns a big stake of the equity, he has an incentive to try harder. The same is true for 
the entrepreneur. This also has to be considered when trying to solve the moral hazard 
problem: When the probability is high that the venture capitalist will put little effort into the 
firm, he should receive a fixed claim security as for example nonconvertible debt or 
nonconvertible preferred equity. Nonconvertible means that it cannot be converted into 
common equity. The venture capitalist will get a fixed payment as long as the entrepreneur 
can pay it, but he does not own equity. Also in the case of preferred equity, the venture 
capitalist is no owner of the firm. In the opposite case, if the venture capitalist is likely to 
work hard, he should receive some equity and ownership rights in form of common equity or 
at least of convertible securities.77 
To solve the problem of shirking the entrepreneur should only be remunerated in the case of 
success. This is the case if the venture capitalist holds a combination of common stock and 
debt or convertible securities. This means that he has senior rights if there was no success.78 
As long as entrepreneurs offer equity or debt as financing form, window dressing will always 
exist assuming that the contracts cannot be renegotiated. The only possibility to mitigate the 
problem is financing through convertible securities. The argument lies in the possibility that 
the venture capitalist who holds the convertible security could convert it as soon as he has the 
impression that the firm will not succeed. Consequently, the entrepreneur’s stake of equity 
would decrease.79  
Venture capitalists avoid being restricted by the entrepreneur by writing clauses in the 
contract that include stock options for the entrepreneur. These options expire after several 
years or after fulfilling a certain goal. These clauses are also called vesting provisions. If the 
entrepreneur leaves the firm, the firm is allowed to buy back only unvested shares. The 
entrepreneur has an incentive to put effort in the business without holding up the investor. 
Furthermore, the venture capitalists can include in the contract that the entrepreneur has no 
permission to be engaged in other similar businesses after leaving the firm. This non-compete 
clause also reinforces the bargaining power of the venture capitalist. Both strategies have the 
aim to make the entrepreneur’s leaving expensive.80 
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4.4 Stage	Financing	
 
In stage financing there are certain requirements in order to receive more capital, which 
entails more effort of the entrepreneur. The venture capitalist provides money in single steps 
instead of handing over the total sum right at the beginning. These financing rounds are often 
tied to the different stages in the venture’s life cycle. In order to be able to assess if the 
entrepreneurs did well the venture capitalist has to set milestones. Therefore, stage financing 
is a combination of monitoring and setting incentives to work harder.81 As a consequence it 
can be said that it is a replacement of intensive monitoring.82  
Stage financing is a form of sequential investment. According to Mölls and Schill83 this is the 
realization of a sequence of investments with increasing amounts of money. Within this chain 
of investments there are no positive cash-flows. Sequential projects are characterized by a 
minimal and a maximal investment rate, which has to be paid as long as the investor does not 
abandon the project. The minimum investment rate can equal zero, which allows investing 
nothing at a certain point without irrevocable exit of the project.   
In return for the investment, the venture capitalist usually receives convertible preferred 
shares. The calculation of the number of shares is based on the valuation of the project. In the 
case of the sale or the IPO of the firm these shares are converted into common stock.84  
 
4.4.1 Advantages			
 
The reasons why venture capitalists decide to use stage financing are diverse. The most 
popular ones are the creation of incentives, the exit option, the mitigation of the hold-up 
problem, the added value and the gathering of information. Additionally, investors want to 
reduce the riskiness of a project by providing the money later.85 
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Wang and Zhou86 have shown that stage financing is more promising than upfront financing if 
the project seems to have potential from the beginning on.  
 
 Creation of incentives 
A big advantage of this method is the creation of incentives for entrepreneurs to accomplish 
certain goals. This can imply better performance of the entrepreneur, and consequently, it 
mitigates the problem of moral hazard by keeping entrepreneurs from shirking 87  
 
 Exit option 
Another reason for introducing stage financing is the exit option. Venture capitalists can 
decide at every stage if they want to continue financing the project or if they prefer 
terminating their investment. Often this decision is dependent on the completion of 
milestones. But having obtained the aim does not always imply the continuation of financing. 
The investors can as well choose to stop providing capital because of other reasons. If they 
observe a much stronger competitor in the market, they may see no sense in investing into a 
weaker player. On the contrary, the venture capitalist may provide additional money even if 
the milestone has not been met. In summary, the investors can evaluate the probability of 
success at every financing stage and draw the consequences. This external observation is very 
important as the entrepreneur itself would hardly close his business as long as he is still 
receiving money from investors. By monitoring venture capitalists can avoid spending money 
for bad projects. The importance of monitoring and being able to abandon the investment 
increases with the riskiness of the project. Not providing additional money means in the most 
cases that the firm has to be closed because other investors have been warned by the decision 
of the venture capitalist.88 
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 Mitigation of hold-up problem 
One benefit of stage financing is that it can alleviate the hold-up problem caused by the 
entrepreneur. The investment of the venture capitalist could result in a menace of leaving the 
firm by the entrepreneur. Stage financing implies that the investor provides less money at 
once so that the entrepreneur cannot leave the firm. This reduces the ability of the 
entrepreneur to hold-up the investor. Tian deviates that the number of rounds will be held 
large in order to mitigate the hold-up problem.89  
Hypothesis 2:  The number of financing stages improves the performance of venture capital-
backed firms. 
 
 Adding value 
Schwienbacher90 argues that the value of the project will be higher with stage financing. 
Because of the single decisions at different stages there is less capital wasted. Schwienbacher 
states that this does not have any impact on the probability of liquidation as an exit route. But 
he points out that it has an ifluence when success is regarded as being dependent on the 
entrepreneur’s behavior and its effort. If the entrepreneur has incentives for putting a lot of 
effort into the project, for example if he benefits privately from working hard, this reduces the 
probability of liquidation. He further argues that the entrepreneur benefits the most if the exit 
strategy going public is chosen. Therefore it can be expected that more IPOs occur when there 
is stage financing. 
Hypothesis 3: Staging improves the performance of venture capital-backed firms. 
Hypothesis 3a: Staging decreases the probability of liquidation, but increases the probability 
of IPOs.  
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 Gathering information 
Investors can learn a lot during the investment stages. They can gather information during the 
first stage and base their decision whether to continue investing on it. This means that the real 
option value of the project is increased by stage financing.91  
 
4.4.2 Disadvantages		
 
 Window-dressing 
Unfortunately, there is also a disadvantage concerning the motivation of entrepreneurs 
obtained through stage financing: One negative consequence could be window-dressing. 
Entrepreneurs may only strive fulfilling the desired goal without thinking about the future of 
their business. The impression the investors will have is more important for the entrepreneur 
than the actual situation of the firm. Therefore, entrepreneurs tend to act short-term orientated. 
Consequently, the venture capitalist’s decisions could be based on wrong, pretended 
information.92 
 
 Underinvestment 
I mentioned earlier that stage financing is a good decision for promising projects. In the case 
of less promising ones it could lead to underinvestment in early stages. In the further progress, 
this could be the reason for the collapse of the project, which maybe could be viable if the 
venture capitalists had chosen upfront financing.93  
 
 Costs of staging 
Another drawback are the costs of staging. Intensive monitoring alone can be very costly and 
also with stage financing there are high expenses involved. A large part of these costs are 
caused by negotiations and contracting. The different stages at which capital is provided 
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induce a higher number of negotiations than usual. Moreover, one single contract is not 
sufficient. Several contracts have to be drafted in order to regulate the financing of every 
single stage. But also the entrepreneur has to face costs. The lower amounts of capital 
provided at once can lead to low economies of scale, longer development cycles and, 
consequently, lags in market entry.94  
Before deciding for stage financing the costs have to be compared with those of monitoring. 
The costs of staging can be reduced by introducing few financing stages. Every additional 
stage causes additional costs because of negotiations and contracting. Tian states that the 
higher monitoring costs are, the more likely monitoring will be replaced by stage financing.95  
Venture capitalists will try to reduce the costs as far as possible. Consequently, they avoid a 
high number of stages. The associated costs would be too high. 
 
 Hold-up costs 
Furthermore, hold-up costs can arise. This point contradicts the advantage mentioned before, 
that the hold-up problem can be solved with the help of stage financing. Fluck, Garrison and 
Myers96 argue that the investor holds up the entrepreneur by being able to stop financing the 
project at every single stage. In addition to that, the investor receives more shares if the value 
is rather low. That leads to a reduction of the stake hold by the entrepreneur itself. As a 
consequence, both lose because the entrepreneur’s incentives to work effectively decrease 
with his stake. The resulting loss in value can be defined as hold-up costs. 
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4.5 Syndication	
 
Syndication is another measurement to improve venture capital deals and mitigate agency 
problems.  
Venture capital syndication is the alliance of more than one venture capital firm. In this case 
an entrepreneur is financed by a collaborating group of at least two investors. The definitions 
of syndication are not consistent in every point. In most of the literature available the 
investments of the different capital providers do not have to take place at the same stage of the 
financing process. But a few authors define syndication as the simultaneous provision of 
capital by more than one venture capitalist. The single venture capitalist firms coinvest, which 
means that they divide the amount of capital invested but also the resulting gain or loss. 97  
In most of the cases there is a lead investor. This is the denomination for the first venture 
capitalist interested into the project, who attracts other venture capitalists to syndicate with 
him.98 The syndicating investors then are called “passive investors”. Usually, the lead investor 
establishes the contact with the entrepreneur and gets an insight into the project and the 
management. Consequently, he is on the board of director. The passive investors are not 
concerned with the management. Sometimes the role of the lead and the passive investor can 
be switched, no matter who was the original initiator of the investment.99 
Syndication occurs not only with venture capital, but also with other financing forms. In fact, 
venture capital syndication is not very differently structured than joint ventures. Both are 
characterized by the cooperation of partners.100  
Regarding the ideal or the most common point of time to syndicate, the findings of diverse 
authors are highly divergent. Brander et al.101 states that syndication usually takes place right 
after the first investment by a venture capitalist. If a venture was financed by at least two 
investors, most times it received the capital of the second one within the year of the initial 
investment. This data is based on information about Canadian venture capitalists. According 
to them there are three types of syndication: The most popular one is syndication in the early 
growth stage. In this case the investments are simultaneously or within a very short period of 
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time. The second type of syndication is not simultaneously. Here, the lead investor provides 
capital at the seed or startup stage, while others do not until later. The third type is the less 
probable. Here, the syndication takes place at the seed or startup stage. Deli and 
Santhanakrishnan102 found that syndication mostly occurs in the early or late stages of the 
venture cycle. During the expansion the probability of syndication is lower. Their argument is 
that in these stages help regarding human capital is needed at a high level. These findings 
contradict those of Brander et al. and those of Ferrary.103 His result is that during the seed 
stage hardly syndication exists. His explanation is that entrepreneurs do not need big amounts 
of money at this stage. He finds that syndications occur more frequently in the later stages – 
the early stage, the expansion stage and the later stage. This is partly consistent with the 
findings of the studies mentioned before. Actually, it is a mixture of both, the results of Deli 
and Santhanakrishnan and the findings of Brander et al.  
These findings are partly contradicting the venture’s life cycle described in chapter 2. There it 
says that venture capital hardly occurs in the seed stage. As a consequence, syndication 
cannot often be introduced at this stage. 
Deli and Santhanakrishnan104 also state that the probability of syndication depends on the 
amount of capital needed by the entrepreneur. The higher the amount of money, the more 
likely venture capitalists will syndicate. Another finding is that during the early and late 
stages of the venture cycle the number of cooperating venture capitalists is especially high. 
Hypothesis 4: The higher the amount of money required the higher is the probability of 
syndication. 
Syndication is very popular in North America but also in Europe. Schwienbacher105 found out 
that syndication occurs more often in the United States than in Europe and also that the 
average size of syndicates is larger. However, in Europe venture capitalists syndicate more 
often with regional partners or collaborate with the government. Schwienbacher concludes 
that the European market is “less liquid and less developed”. 
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4.5.1 Advantages	
 
There are a lot of motives for venture capital syndication. The most popular or at least the 
most often mentioned ones in literature are the sharing of risk, the increasing expertise, the 
value added to the project and the higher amount of capital available. 
 
 More expertise 
One reason for syndication is the evaluation of the project by more than just one investor, 
which leads to more expertise. This reason for syndication was first mentioned by Lerner.106 
Before the investment is made, or in the case of staging before further capital is provided, the 
entrepreneur’s project is screened by different venture capitalists. After evaluating a firm or a 
project the venture capitalist may want to discuss his results and listen to opinions of other 
venture capitalists. Especially, if there are doubts about the project’s quality, syndication can 
provide more information. Thus, syndication is a way to reduce information asymmetries. The 
combination of more than just one evaluation can lead to better decisions regarding the 
selection of an investment or regarding the financing of another investment round. 
Consequently, it can reduce the probability of providing capital to bad projects. The 
syndicating parties can learn from each other.107 Brander et al.108 found that additional 
opinions are only necessary when a project’s quality is rather uncertain. If a project is 
regarded as good from the beginning on, syndication for this only reason is needless.  
To Huy and Jaeger109 point out the importance of syndication for foreign investors. It allows 
them to collaborate with local venture capitalists in order to better evaluate the venture’s 
situation. They also emphasize that a better selection of investments should imply a better 
performance of the ventures backed by syndication.  
Of course the advantage of more expertise is especially beneficial for young and 
inexperienced venture capitalists. They can learn from their partners in the syndication and 
build up recognition at the same time. Normally, they should not be able to finance a project 
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on their own. Not only because of missing money but also because of their lack of experience 
in evaluating investments, syndication is very attractive for them. 110  
According to Hopp111venture capitalists with a lot of industry experience decide for 
syndication more often. Of course, it seems more logical that inexperienced firms need 
partners as already mentioned before, but experienced ones benefit from their already existing 
network and the consequently better selection of partners. For them it is easier to find partners 
than for inexperienced young firms. 
Screening is also mentioned as a measure against adverse selection. Venture capitalists that 
syndicate take advantage from information sharing and better screening. The due diligence 
process is more precise as the know-how and skills of all syndicated investors join together. 
This reduces information asymmetries and consequently also adverse selection.112 
 
 Diversification of risk 
Furthermore, literature often mentions the diversification of risk due to syndication. It is 
argued that every venture capitalist has only to bear his part of the risk. The logical 
consequence would be that risky projects are financed mostly by more than just one investor. 
Brander et al. showed that syndicated projects are usually risky because they have a higher 
volatility and higher returns.113   
This again highlights hypothesis 4. It says that projects requiring a lot of capital more often 
need syndication. 
Another way of diversifying the risk is to invest in more projects than just one. As the 
portfolio theory says the risk of a portfolio can be reduced by investing into a large number of 
investments which are not correlated with each other. Due to syndication enough capital 
remains to invest in other projects as well. Especially for smaller venture capital firms this 
opens up new possibilities. In that way they can invest into projects that require a huge 
amount of capital as well.114 
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113 Brander, Amit, & Antweiler (2002), p. 449, To Huy & Jaeger (2011), p. 5 
114 To Huy & Jaeger (2011), p. 4 
34 
 
Entrepreneurs can protect themselves by seeking money from more than just one venture 
capitalist so that the dependency on one capital supplier is reduced. Additionally, it is less 
probable that renegotiations with syndicating venture capitalists are started than with non-
syndicated. This is explained by the amount of additional possibilities a syndicating venture 
capitalist has.115  
 
 Creating value 
Brander et al.116 found that syndication of venture capitalists implies higher rates of return 
than financing through a single investor. Therefore, syndication adds value. Also Checkley et 
al.117 point out that syndication improves the firm performance of ventures. They defined 
performance as “a firm’s annual share of IPOs generated, by share of exits, and by share of 
liquidations”. Tian118 showed that firms financed through venture capital syndication are more 
likely to exit successfully, which can be seen as a measurement for good performance. From 
that he derived that syndication leads to higher product and financial market values. 
Hypothesis 5: Syndication improves the performance of venture capital-backed firms. 
Hypothesis 5a: Syndication decreases the probability of liquidation, but increases the 
probability of going public. 
The advantage of having more expertise due to syndication also points out that the 
performance will increase. 
To Huy and Jaeger119 state, based on Lerner’s findings, that syndication does not have a 
positive effect on the performance of entrepreneurs. They give us the explanation, that a very 
promising venture will be financed by only one single investor. He would not ask other 
venture capitalists to syndicate when he is sure about a good outcome. Only if he is unsecure 
about the quality but thinks that it can be successful, he will contact and try to attract other 
investors. Syndicating with them is better than being competitors. This points out the risk of 
adverse selection in syndication. The lead investor chooses his partners not only because of 
their money. He also wants to avoid competition. Consequently, To Huy and Jaeger came to 
                                                 
115 Cumming & Johan (2009), p. 290, p. 306 
116 Brander, Amit, & Antweiler (2002), p. 450 
117 Checkley, Higón, & Angwin (2010), pp. 195-197 
118 Tian (Forthcoming) 
119 To Huy & Jaeger (2011), pp. 7-8, pp. 27-28 
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the conclusion and also proofed that syndication has no or even a negative impact on the 
performance of the venture. Their data was based on French ventures. This finding contradicts 
those of Brander et al. and of Tian.  
 
 Providing more capital 
An obvious advantage of syndication is the ability of providing more capital. Especially, 
when a project needs more capital than one single venture capitalist can make available, 
syndication can solve the problem of suffering from a lack of resources. This is not only true 
for financial but also for human capital. As mentioned already before, venture capitalists do 
not simply offer money. In addition to that they also advise the management.120  
 
4.5.2 Disadvantages	
 
Deli and Santhanakrishnan121 state that syndication does not occur more often than 
investments by just one venture capitalist. This implies that this strategy does not only entail 
advantages but also drawbacks. One downside are the agency costs.122  
However, there does not exist a lot of literature about the disadvantages of syndication in 
venture capital deals.  
  
                                                 
120 Deli & Santhanakrishnan (2010), p. 561 
121 Deli & Santhanakrishnan (2010), p. 562 
122 Deli & Santhanakrishnan (2010), p. 562 
36 
 
5. Empirical	Analysis	
 
5.1 Description	of	Data	
 
The data used for this analysis is from Venture Source. It contains data about 132 Austrian 
firms that received external financing. I excluded all firms that did not receive the capital 
from venture capital firms, but from business angels or individual investors. Furthermore, I 
eliminated investments which are financed through government grants, non-venture capital 
individuals, loans, other private equity, management buyout, corporate, secondary transaction 
or bridge loans.  
In addition to that, I had to delete all financing rounds with missing data about investors. 
Sometimes it was not specified which investors provided the capital in a certain financing 
stage. This makes it impossible to include those rounds into my analysis. I did not know if the 
same investors continued financing which would indicate stage financing or if new investors 
entered which would stand for syndication. 
An important point in my analysis is the stage of development in which the firms received 
capital from investors. As many firms out of the healthcare industry run through another 
development, I decided to exclude them. They run through different stages of clinical trials 
which are not comparable with the product development in other industries. Therefore, I could 
not assign them to stages in the venture cycle.  
After this selection, there were 108 firms remaining that all together went through 186 
financing rounds by venture capitalists. 30 of these firms are already out of business, 78 are 
still operating.  
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5.2 Methodology	
 
To analyze the data I used STATA. The data provides the most important information which 
had to be transformed into an appropriate way to be analyzed with STATA. Therefore, I 
developed a table in EXCEL containing the variables required.  
First of all, I made some basic calculations to derive general descriptive results. These results 
show the frequency of certain categories or numbers and if needed their mean, maximum and 
minimum values. 
For deeper analysis I used regression analysis. This makes it possible to find a relationship 
between two variables. To start with this, I had to categorize the variables into metric, 
continuous, dichotomy or categorical. Depending on the type of variable, especially of the 
depending variable, I decided for a type of regression analysis. In the case of metric or 
continuous variables I used linear regression analysis, for dichotomous variables logistic 
regression and for categorical multinomial logistic regression analysis. 
An important point here is the creation of dummy variables. In order to carry out the 
regression analysis I had to convert categorical variables into dummy variables. In addition to 
that, new variables had to be introduced. To find results concerning the impact of syndication 
and staging I first had to create dummy variables pointing out if the firm got staged or 
syndicated financing. Furthermore, I introduced a variable that indicates the total amount 
invested into a firm. The data just provided information about the amount invested in single 
rounds. Therefore, I summed up all the amounts of the relevant rounds. Unfortunately, there 
was some information missing. If the amount invested of one relevant round was missing, I 
did not sum up the residual values but left it out. This way these cases are treated as missing 
information. 
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5.3 Overview	of	hypotheses	
 
Following, there is a short overview of the hypotheses made in the theoretical part of this 
thesis. The hypotheses are numbered consecutively. 
Hypothesis 1 Venture capital improves the firm performance. 
Hypothesis 1a 
Venture capital reduces the probability of liquidation, but increases the probability 
of going public. 
Hypothesis 2 
The number of financing stages improves the performance of venture capital-backed 
firms. 
Hypothesis 3 Staging improves the performance of venture capital-backed firms. 
Hypothesis 3a 
Staging reduces the probability of liquidation, but increases the probability of going-
public. 
Hypothesis 4 
The higher the amount of money required, the higher is the probability of 
syndication. 
Hypothesis 5 Syndication improves the performance of venture capital-backed firms. 
Hypothesis 5a 
Syndication reduces the probability of liquidation, but increases the probability of 
going public. 
 
Figure 3: Overview of hypotheses 
 
5.4 Descriptive	statistics	
 
The data provides information about the industry group of the firm, its current business status, 
its current stage of development, its stage of development at the financing round, the year the 
firm was founded, the close date of the financing round, the round type, the invested amount 
and the investors divided into lead and round investors.  
The different industry groups the venture capital backed firms are operating in are 
Business/Consumer/Retail, Information Technology, Healthcare and Other. Unfortunately, the 
information about the industry group is missing for some firms. Out of the 108 remaining 
firms 20 operate in Business/Consumer/Retail, 54, and therefore the majority, in Information 
Technology, 22 in Healthcare and nine in other industry groups. About the remaining three 
firms we do not have any information. 
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Figure 4: Industry groups 
 
Another interesting information is the current business status. Here, there are the following 
categories: Acquired/Merged, Out Of Business, Private & Independent and Publicly-held. 
Most of the analyzed firms, 60 out of 108, are private and independent. 30 are out of business, 
and therefore, already stopped operating. 14 are acquired or merged and four are publicly-
held.  
Hypotheses 1 and 1a deal with the impact of venture capital on the current business status. 
Unfortunately, I have no data to compare the status of venture capital-backed firms with those 
of non venture capital-backed ones. How often a status occurs in this data does not tell enough 
to confirm or withdraw these hypotheses. However, one could say that “out of business” still 
occurs very often and it is doubtful that this is an improvement compared with non venture 
capital deals. 
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Figure 5: Business status 
 
For analyzing the stage of development the stated stages have to be assigned to the different 
stages of the venture cycle. The data gives us information about the status of the product 
developed in the firm. Therefore the terms “Shipping Product”, “Profitable”, “Product 
Development”, “Product in Beta Test” and “Start-up” are used. We have information about 
the current stage of development and the stage of development at the round of financing. 
Currently, with 71 firms most of the products are in the shipping process. This can be 
interpreted as a good sign. It means that the development is more or less completed. 27 are 
profitable and ten are still in development. This seems to be a good result but first, the 
numbers have to be compared with the stage of development at the financing round. At this 
point 78 firms were in the shipping product, 24 in product development, four were a startup, 
one was in beta-test and one already profitable. This shows that now far more firms are 
profitable as before and only few find itself still in development.  
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Business status
Acquired/Merged
Out of business
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Figure 6: Stage of development before and after financing 
 
Furthermore, the data contains the round type. Here, it is distinguished between seed round, 
first round, second round and later stage. Normally, these round types can be brought in 
connection with the stage of development. As already mentioned, I sorted out all other round 
types as for example second transaction. With a number of 91 most of the investments have 
been made in the first round. In the second round only one investment started. Five firms 
received their first capital already in the seed stage and eleven in the later stage.  
In fact, the round types are linked to the stage of development. Start-up is the earliest stage 
which occurs in the seed stage. Product development takes place in the seed round and the 
first round. Product in beta test is part of the first round as well as being profitable. Apart 
from the first round being profitable can also be assigned to the later stage and the seed round. 
The shipping process can happen in all rounds.  
Finally, the investors divided into lead and round investors show us how many of the 
investments have been staged or syndicated. These points are discussed below.  
In addition to that, the data provides the amount invested for each round. I calculated the total 
amount invested for each firm. Therefore, I only took into account the rounds I did not 
exclude from the analysis. Unfortunately, some information is missing and I was not able to 
do the calculation for each of the 108 firms. For nine firms I have no results. The average 
amount invested is 6.74 million Euros. The minimum is 300,000 Euros and the maximum 137 
million Euros. The standard deviation of 15.64 emphasizes the large range of invested capital.   
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5.5 The	impact	of	the	venture	capital	on	performance		
 
In order to analyze the impact of staging on the performance of venture capital-backed firms, 
I took a look at the current business status of the firms. 
The current business status can be seen as a measurement of performance. Based on the 
description of the single exit strategies in chapter 2, I sorted them by their level of 
performance.   
As an initial public offering only is possible if the firm fulfills certain requirements, it can be 
assumed that the performance of this firm has to be rather good. Especially as one of the usual 
requirements is a minimum market value, I would rank this exit strategy as the most 
performance-orientated one. Consequently, the business status publicly-traded is a sign for 
good performance. 
That liquidation stands for poor performance is self-explanatory. The exit route liquidation 
here is equal to the business status out of business. 
The business status acquired/merged is the consequence of the exit strategy trade sale. A firm 
will only be bought if the performance is acceptable, but it does not have to be that great as 
for an initial public offering.  
Private and independent is difficult to classify. There is no information available if the firms 
still receive money from the investors or not. Private and independent therefore could mean 
that the financing is not yet completed. Therefore, it is not possible to make statements based 
on this business status about the performance of the firm.  
As a consequence I list the different business status in descending order measured from their 
level of performance:  
1. Publicly-held – very good performance 
2. Acquired/merged – good performance 
3. Private and Independent – unknown performance, but not too bad 
4. Out of business – poor performance 
Based on this ranking, publicly-held and acquired/merged can be pooled as business status 
that improve the performance. Out of business means that the probability of bad performance 
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decreases. In the further process, I denominated publicly-held and acquired/merged as good, 
out of business as bad and private and independent as unknown performance. 
Unfortunately, I am not able to compare the performance of venture capital-backed and non 
venture capital-backed firms due to missing data. Instead I looked at the impact of the amount 
of money invested. If venture capital improves the performance of firms, the probability of 
good performance should increase with the amount invested. 
First, I introduced the categorical variable performance with the three categories good 
performance, bad performance and unknown performance. Then, I did a multinomial 
regression analysis with performance as dependent variable and the total amount invested as 
independent variable. In the further process I looked at the average marginal effects. They 
give more information about the impact of one variable. The coefficients of a multinomial 
logistic regression analysis cannot be interpreted easily. The results show no significant 
relationships as all p-values are higher than the alpha-level 0.05. In other words, the 
probability of good, bad or unknown performance does not change significantly with the 
amount invested. 
This withdraws hypothesis 1 which states that venture capital increases the firm performance.  
 
 
 
Figure 7: The  impact of the total amount invested on firm performance 
                                                                              
 totalamount    -.0034294   .0065647    -0.52   0.601    -.0162961    .0094373
                                                                              
                    dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Delta-method
                                                                              
dy/dx w.r.t. : totalamount
Expression   : Pr(performance==Good), predict(outcome(1))
Model VCE    : OIM
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =         99
. margins, dydx(*) predict(outcome(1))
                                                                              
 totalamount    -.0096048   .0086468    -1.11   0.267    -.0265523    .0073427
                                                                              
                    dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Delta-method
                                                                              
dy/dx w.r.t. : totalamount
Expression   : Pr(performance==Bad), predict(outcome(2))
Model VCE    : OIM
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =         99
                                                                              
 totalamount     .0130342   .0079815     1.63   0.102    -.0026092    .0286777
                                                                              
                    dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Delta-method
                                                                              
dy/dx w.r.t. : totalamount
Expression   : Pr(performance==Unknown), predict(outcome(3))
Model VCE    : OIM
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =         99
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The same is true for other factors, as the industry group, the stage of development at the round 
of financing and the financing round. Again, no significant relationships can be found. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: The impact of other factors on firm performance 
 
                                                                              
       other    (omitted)
          IT     1.828447   164.1528     0.01   0.991     -319.905    323.5619
  Healthcare     1.892317   164.1528     0.01   0.991    -319.8412    323.6258
    Business     1.938011   164.1528     0.01   0.991    -319.7955    323.6715
 totalamount     .0087771   .0067625     1.30   0.194    -.0044771    .0220312
     startup    (omitted)
    shipping     .6552277   743.7774     0.00   0.999    -1457.122    1458.432
  profitable     3.138707   1498.958     0.00   0.998    -2934.765    2941.043
        beta    -.9910346    991.004    -0.00   0.999    -1943.323    1941.341
 development     .4226256   743.7773     0.00   1.000    -1457.354    1458.199
        seed    (omitted)
      second     .1450163   1318.967     0.00   1.000    -2584.984    2585.274
       later     1.273717   654.8924     0.00   0.998    -1282.292    1284.839
       first     1.274956   654.8924     0.00   0.998    -1282.291    1284.841
                                                                              
                    dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Delta-method
                                                                              
               other
dy/dx w.r.t. : first later second seed development beta profitable shipping startup totalamount Business Healthcare IT
Expression   : Pr(performance==Good), predict(outcome(1))
Model VCE    : OIM
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =         97
                                                                              
       other    (omitted)
          IT    -.4482642   58.17394    -0.01   0.994    -114.4671    113.5706
  Healthcare    -.7047652     58.174    -0.01   0.990    -114.7237    113.3142
    Business    -.6071795   58.17393    -0.01   0.992     -114.626    113.4116
 totalamount    -.0441206   .0178091    -2.48   0.013    -.0790258   -.0092153
     startup    (omitted)
    shipping    -2.121201   695.5333    -0.00   0.998    -1365.341    1361.099
  profitable    -3.116535   3353.732    -0.00   0.999    -6576.311    6570.078
        beta    -2.350454   975.6643    -0.00   0.998    -1914.617    1909.916
 development    -1.983996   695.5333    -0.00   0.998    -1365.204    1361.236
        seed    (omitted)
      second     5.619061   980.1716     0.01   0.995    -1915.482     1926.72
       later     1.190802   684.2172     0.00   0.999     -1339.85    1342.232
       first      1.12826   684.2172     0.00   0.999    -1339.913    1342.169
                                                                              
                    dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Delta-method
                                                                              
               other
dy/dx w.r.t. : first later second seed development beta profitable shipping startup totalamount Business Healthcare IT
Expression   : Pr(performance==Bad), predict(outcome(2))
Model VCE    : OIM
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =         97
                                                                              
       other    (omitted)
          IT    -1.380183   105.9792    -0.01   0.990    -209.0955    206.3352
  Healthcare    -1.187552   105.9793    -0.01   0.991    -208.9031     206.528
    Business    -1.330831   105.9792    -0.01   0.990    -209.0462    206.3846
 totalamount     .0353435   .0138048     2.56   0.010     .0082866    .0624004
     startup    (omitted)
    shipping     1.465974   664.0646     0.00   0.998    -1300.077    1303.009
  profitable    -.0221722   3408.858    -0.00   1.000    -6681.261    6681.217
        beta     3.341489   911.1231     0.00   0.997    -1782.427     1789.11
 development      1.56137   664.0646     0.00   0.998    -1299.981    1303.104
        seed    (omitted)
      second    -5.764078   1357.379    -0.00   0.997    -2666.179     2654.65
       later    -2.464519   623.8293    -0.00   0.997    -1225.147    1220.218
       first    -2.403216   623.8293    -0.00   0.997    -1225.086     1220.28
                                                                              
                    dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Delta-method
                                                                              
               other
dy/dx w.r.t. : first later second seed development beta profitable shipping startup totalamount Business Healthcare IT
Expression   : Pr(performance==Unknown), predict(outcome(3))
Model VCE    : OIM
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =         97
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Hypothesis 1a states that venture capital reduces the probability of liquidation, but increases 
those of going public. Basically, it has the same meaning as hypothesis 1. Nevertheless, I 
want to look at the two business status. Liquidation is here called out of business and going 
public publicly. 
 
 
 
Figure 9: The impact of venture capital on the business status 
 
Between the total amount and the two business status out of business and publicly there is no 
significant relationship. In both cases the p-value is higher than the alpha-level of 0.05. As 
expected this is basically the same result as in the regression analysis with the dependent 
variable performance.  
Hypothesis 1a cannot be confirmed. 
  
                                                                              
 totalamount    -.0094695   .0086904    -1.09   0.276    -.0265023    .0075634
                                                                              
                    dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Delta-method
                                                                              
dy/dx w.r.t. : totalamount
Expression   : Pr(status==Out_of_Business), predict(outcome(2))
Model VCE    : OIM
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =         99
                                                                              
 totalamount     .0000854   .0023758     0.04   0.971     -.004571    .0047418
                                                                              
                    dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Delta-method
                                                                              
dy/dx w.r.t. : totalamount
Expression   : Pr(status==Publicly), predict(outcome(3))
Model VCE    : OIM
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =         99
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5.6 Impact	of	Staging	
 
As mentioned before, staging has positive but also some negative effects. Altogether, it 
should occur rather often and lead to better performance. 
The data does not point out which investments were staged and which not. Therefore, I 
decided to assume that all investments that have been financed by the same investors for more 
often than once are staged. Of course, it is possible that these investors did not plan to stage 
upfront but decided later on to provide more capital. Maybe the entrepreneur asked for more 
money although he already received all the capital upfront. However, as it is not possible to 
distinguish between these types, I had to assume that all of them are cases of staging. 
Furthermore, I counted how many stages they introduced. Once again, we do not know if all 
these stages have been planned before. Another problem I had to face was that within some 
firms more than just one investor provided the money in stages. In these cases, I only 
analyzed one investor and decided to take that one with the most stages.  
For being able to analyze the impact of staging I introduced a dummy variable with 1 for 
staging and 0 for non-staging.  
In this analysis, 44 firms are financed through stage financing by venture capitalist, which are 
40,74 % of all 108 venture capital backed firms included in the data. This is less than 
expected as the advantages of staging clearly dominate the drawbacks.  
 
5.6.1 The	number	of	stages	
 
Hypothesis 2 deals with the number of stages. It says that the number of stages improves the 
performance of venture capital-backed firms. This topic will be discussed later. 
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Figure 10: Staging 
 
The maximal amount of stages in this data is four, but only in the case of two firms the 
venture capitalist invested in that many stages. Only nine firms received money in three 
stages. The remaining 33 firms got their capital divided into two stages.  
This could lead to the assumption, that staging is not that prominent in Austria as it is in other 
countries. A connection with missing positive effects on the performance of the firms is 
probable. 
With 33 firms out of the 44 financed through stages 75 percent receive the capital in only two 
stages. This is the minimal amount of stages possible. 
Furthermore, I tested if the number of stages is dependent on the financing round it was 
introduced. It can be expected that if financing was started during the earlier rounds like seed 
or first round there occur more stages. The results below do not show a relationship. 
Numberstages is the dependent variable. As I use it as a categorical variable I ran through a 
multinomial logistic regression with the single round types as independent variables. The 
average marginal effects show no significant relationships as all p-values are higher than 0.05. 
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3 stages
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Figure 11: The impact of the financing round on the number of stages 
 
5.6.2 The	impact	of	staging	on	performance	
 
I want to detect if it is true that staging as a financing strategy in venture capital deals 
increases the performance of the supported firms. Consequently, the probability of the 
business status publicly-held should increase, the probability of out of business should 
decrease with the use of staging. Therefore, in the regression analysis performance is the 
dependent variable, stage the predictor variable. Additional, I add the single industry groups, 
stages of development at the financing round and the financing rounds as predictor variables. 
                                                                              
        seed    (omitted)
      second     3.026231   751.0919     0.00   0.997    -1469.087    1475.139
       later     .2644438   184.9638     0.00   0.999    -362.2578    362.7867
       first    -.6936729   159.4355    -0.00   0.997    -313.1815    311.7941
                                                                              
                    dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Delta-method
                                                                              
dy/dx w.r.t. : first later second seed
Expression   : Pr(numberstages==1), predict(outcome(1))
Model VCE    : OIM
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =        108
                                                                              
        seed    (omitted)
      second    -3.445178   770.7698    -0.00   0.996    -1514.126    1507.236
       later    -.2772784   94.22706    -0.00   0.998    -184.9589    184.4044
       first    -.6743134     81.222    -0.01   0.993    -159.8665    158.5179
                                                                              
                    dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Delta-method
                                                                              
dy/dx w.r.t. : first later second seed
Expression   : Pr(numberstages==2), predict(outcome(2))
Model VCE    : OIM
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =        108
                                                                              
        seed    (omitted)
      second     .3427745   569.7289     0.00   1.000    -1116.305    1116.991
       later      .010501   259.1967     0.00   1.000    -508.0057    508.0267
       first     1.119261   223.4229     0.01   0.996    -436.7816    439.0201
                                                                              
                    dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Delta-method
                                                                              
dy/dx w.r.t. : first later second seed
Expression   : Pr(numberstages==3), predict(outcome(3))
Model VCE    : OIM
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =        108
                                                                              
        seed    (omitted)
      second     .0761721   288.5605     0.00   1.000    -565.4921    565.6444
       later     .0023336     132.59     0.00   1.000    -259.8694     259.874
       first     .2487247   114.2903     0.00   0.998    -223.7561    224.2535
                                                                              
                    dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Delta-method
                                                                              
dy/dx w.r.t. : first later second seed
Expression   : Pr(numberstages==4), predict(outcome(4))
Model VCE    : OIM
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =        108
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The average marginal effects do not show a lot of significant relationships. The p-value is 
only in two cases below 0.05, the alpha-level: There is a significant negative relationship 
between bad performance and staging. This means that staging decreases the probability of a 
bad performance by 23 percent. Furthermore, there is a significant positive relationship 
between unknown performance and staging. The fact that the probability of unknown 
performance increases by 20 percent under staging does not tell a lot about the impact of 
staging on performance. The null hypothesis for the relationship between good performance 
and staging cannot be withdrawn due to the high p-value. Therefore, it cannot be said that the 
relationship is significant. However, the effect of staging on the probability of good 
performance with three percent would be very small anyway. Looking at the other 
independent variables there cannot be seen one single significant relationship. The industry 
group, stage of development at the financing round and the financing round have no impact 
on the performance of the venture capital-backed firm.  
Hypothesis 3 says that staging has a positive impact on the performance of venture capital-
backed firms. On the one hand, this analysis shows that there is a slight positive impact as the 
probability of bad performance decreases with staging. This is of course an improvement. On 
the other hand, there is no significant relationship between good performance and staging. 
Therefore hypothesis 3 can only be confirmed partially.  
 
                                                                               
     startup    (omitted)
    shipping     .7395212   703.7247     0.00   0.999    -1378.536    1380.015
  profitable     3.153177   1678.436     0.00   0.999     -3286.52    3292.827
        beta    -.4900692   939.3343    -0.00   1.000    -1841.552    1840.571
 development     .5079784   703.7247     0.00   0.999    -1378.767    1379.783
        seed    (omitted)
      second     .3286858   1285.601     0.00   1.000    -2519.402     2520.06
       later     1.073261   622.1902     0.00   0.999    -1218.397    1220.544
       first      1.07866   622.1902     0.00   0.999    -1218.392    1220.549
       other    (omitted)
          IT     1.715942   157.4858     0.01   0.991    -306.9506    310.3825
  Healthcare     1.796555   157.4859     0.01   0.991    -306.8701    310.4632
    Business     1.819901   157.4858     0.01   0.991    -306.8467    310.4865
       stage     .0299423   .0672699     0.45   0.656    -.1019043    .1617889
                                                                              
                    dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Delta-method
                                                                              
dy/dx w.r.t. : stage Business Healthcare IT other first later second seed development beta profitable shipping startup
Expression   : Pr(performance==Good), predict(outcome(1))
Model VCE    : OIM
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =        105
50 
 
 
 
Figure 12: The impact of staging on performance 
 
Again, I also looked at the business status out of business and publicly. There is a significant  
negative relationship between out of business and staging. The probability of being out of 
business decreases by 23 percent when staging occurs. This accords with the result of the 
analysis with performance as dependent variable. For publicly there is no significant 
relationship. 
Hypothesis 3a can only be confirmed partially. 
                                                                              
     startup    (omitted)
    shipping    -2.792315   696.3326    -0.00   0.997    -1367.579    1361.994
  profitable    -3.778268   4327.124    -0.00   0.999    -8484.785    8477.229
        beta    -4.693839   977.6661    -0.00   0.996    -1920.884    1911.496
 development    -2.750576   696.3326    -0.00   0.997    -1367.537    1362.036
        seed    (omitted)
      second     4.595646   1002.035     0.00   0.996    -1959.356    1968.547
       later     1.817406   686.2594     0.00   0.998    -1343.226    1346.861
       first     1.724122   686.2594     0.00   0.998     -1343.32    1346.768
       other    (omitted)
          IT    -.4308839   56.52569    -0.01   0.994    -111.2192    110.3574
  Healthcare    -.6500243   56.52575    -0.01   0.991    -111.4385    110.1384
    Business    -.5265595   56.52569    -0.01   0.993    -111.3149    110.2618
       stage    -.2318445   .0887432    -2.61   0.009     -.405778   -.0579109
                                                                              
                    dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Delta-method
                                                                              
dy/dx w.r.t. : stage Business Healthcare IT other first later second seed development beta profitable shipping startup
Expression   : Pr(performance==Bad), predict(outcome(2))
Model VCE    : OIM
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =        105
                                                                              
     startup    (omitted)
    shipping     2.052793   657.3034     0.00   0.998    -1286.238    1290.344
  profitable     .6250906   4340.333     0.00   1.000    -8506.271    8507.522
        beta     5.183908   905.3537     0.01   0.995    -1769.277    1779.645
 development     2.242598   657.3034     0.00   0.997    -1286.048    1290.534
        seed    (omitted)
      second    -4.924331   1354.558    -0.00   0.997    -2659.809     2649.96
       later    -2.890667   622.5895    -0.00   0.996    -1223.144    1217.362
       first    -2.802783   622.5895    -0.00   0.996    -1223.056     1217.45
       other    (omitted)
          IT    -1.285058   100.9605    -0.01   0.990    -199.1641    196.5939
  Healthcare     -1.14653   100.9606    -0.01   0.991    -199.0257    196.7326
    Business    -1.293342   100.9605    -0.01   0.990    -199.1724    196.5857
       stage     .2019022     .08971     2.25   0.024     .0260739    .3777305
                                                                              
                    dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Delta-method
                                                                              
dy/dx w.r.t. : stage Business Healthcare IT other first later second seed development beta profitable shipping startup
Expression   : Pr(performance==Unknown), predict(outcome(3))
Model VCE    : OIM
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =        105
51 
 
 
 
Figure 13: The impact of staging on the business status 
 
Interaction effects 
Another interesting question is if this relationship is dependent on other factors, as for 
example the industry the firm is operating in. In addition to that, the stage of development at 
the financing round could also have an impact on the relationship between staging and 
performance. The results of the regression analysis before did not show any relationships 
between these factors and performance. Therefore, I now want to look at different samples. 
It would make no sense to look at every single category of each variable as this would not 
bring a lot of new results. Instead I picked out those that seem to be the most interesting.  
Out of the single industry groups IT seems promising as venture capital often occurs in high- 
technology firms. Therefore it is possible that venture capital and consequently staging 
influences the performance of the firms in this sector more than usually.  
                                                                              
     startup    (omitted)
    shipping    -3.211741    1189.73    -0.00   0.998    -2335.039    2328.616
  profitable    -4.083106   12397.87    -0.00   1.000    -24303.46    24295.29
        beta    -5.254412   1671.976    -0.00   0.997    -3282.267    3271.758
 development    -3.051793   1189.539    -0.00   0.998    -2334.505    2328.402
        seed    (omitted)
      second      5.13485   1626.543     0.00   0.997    -3182.831    3193.101
       later     2.351424   1175.572     0.00   0.998    -2301.727     2306.43
       first     2.119203    1175.17     0.00   0.999    -2301.172     2305.41
       other    (omitted)
          IT    -.4734609    97.9209    -0.00   0.996    -192.3949     191.448
  Healthcare     -.556878   100.5635    -0.01   0.996    -197.6578     196.544
    Business    -.5682104   97.92089    -0.01   0.995    -192.4896    191.3532
       stage    -.2320702   .0884516    -2.62   0.009    -.4054322   -.0587081
                                                                              
                    dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Delta-method
                                                                              
dy/dx w.r.t. : stage Business Healthcare IT other first later second seed development beta profitable shipping startup
Expression   : Pr(status==Out_of_Business), predict(outcome(2))
Model VCE    : OIM
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =        105
                                                                              
     startup    (omitted)
    shipping     1.089437   675.5112     0.00   0.999    -1322.888    1325.067
  profitable      .966174   5912.814     0.00   1.000    -11587.94    11589.87
        beta     .7469467   907.1331     0.00   0.999    -1777.201    1778.695
 development     .5664511   671.0916     0.00   0.999    -1314.749    1315.882
        seed    (omitted)
      second    -.8355506   1147.791    -0.00   0.999    -2250.464    2248.793
       later    -1.208124   625.9334    -0.00   0.998    -1228.015    1225.599
       first    -.6737276   615.9583    -0.00   0.999     -1207.93    1206.582
       other    (omitted)
          IT     .4283285    157.041     0.00   0.998    -307.3663     308.223
  Healthcare    -.0649035   177.5948    -0.00   1.000    -348.1443    348.0145
    Business     .4796552    157.041     0.00   0.998     -307.315    308.2743
       stage     .0402815   .0384099     1.05   0.294    -.0350004    .1155635
                                                                              
                    dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Delta-method
                                                                              
dy/dx w.r.t. : stage Business Healthcare IT other first later second seed development beta profitable shipping startup
Expression   : Pr(status==Publicly), predict(outcome(3))
Model VCE    : OIM
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =        105
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Figure 14: The impact of staging on the performance of firms in the IT sector 
 
There is a significant negative relationship between bad performance and staging in firms in 
the IT sector. If staging occurs the probability of bad performance decreases by 36 percent. 
This is a more obvious improvement of performance than the general result for all industry 
sectors. 
Another interesting category is the first round as financing round. Financing that begins at this 
round has good chances to be successful as the risk is lower than in the seed stage but there is 
still enough time and  possibility to support the firm. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                              
       stage     .0379146   .0891197     0.43   0.671    -.1367569    .2125861
                                                                              
                    dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Delta-method
                                                                              
dy/dx w.r.t. : stage
Expression   : Pr(performance==Good), predict(outcome(1))
Model VCE    : OIM
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =         54
       stage     -.359067   .1072028    -3.35   0.001    -.5691807   -.1489534
                                                                              
                    dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Delta-method
                                                                              
dy/dx w.r.t. : stage
Expression   : Pr(performance==Bad), predict(outcome(2))
Model VCE    : OIM
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =         54
                                                                              
       stage     .3211524   .1026865     3.13   0.002     .1198905    .5224143
                                                                              
                    dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Delta-method
                                                                              
dy/dx w.r.t. : stage
Expression   : Pr(performance==Unknown), predict(outcome(3))
Model VCE    : OIM
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =         54
53 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15: The impact of staging beginning in the first round on the performance  
 
For financing under staging that was introduced in the first round there are significant 
relationships with bad and unknown performance. Again, the probability of bad performance 
decreases, this time by 25 percent.  
 
 
 
                                                                              
       stage     .0224002   .0754314     0.30   0.766    -.1254427     .170243
                                                                              
                    dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Delta-method
                                                                              
dy/dx w.r.t. : stage
Expression   : Pr(performance==Good), predict(outcome(1))
Model VCE    : OIM
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =         91
                                                                              
       stage    -.2499872   .0938387    -2.66   0.008    -.4339077   -.0660668
                                                                              
                    dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Delta-method
                                                                              
dy/dx w.r.t. : stage
Expression   : Pr(performance==Bad), predict(outcome(2))
Model VCE    : OIM
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =         91
                                                                              
       stage      .227587    .097305     2.34   0.019     .0368728    .4183012
                                                                              
                    dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Delta-method
                                                                              
dy/dx w.r.t. : stage
Expression   : Pr(performance==Unknown), predict(outcome(3))
Model VCE    : OIM
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =         91
                                                                              
numberstages     .0375792   .0455131     0.83   0.409    -.0516249    .1267832
                                                                              
                    dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Delta-method
                                                                              
dy/dx w.r.t. : numberstages
Expression   : Pr(performance==Good), predict(outcome(1))
Model VCE    : OIM
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =        108
                                                                              
numberstages    -.1962279   .0726289    -2.70   0.007     -.338578   -.0538779
                                                                              
                    dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Delta-method
                                                                              
dy/dx w.r.t. : numberstages
Expression   : Pr(performance==Bad), predict(outcome(2))
Model VCE    : OIM
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =        108
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Figure 16: The impact of the number of stages on performance 
 
Furthermore, I tested if the number of stages has an influence on the performance of the firm. 
As number of stages now is the independent variable I introduced it as continuous variable. 
The multinomial logistic regression shows that the p-vales for bad performance and unknown 
performance are below 0.05. There is a negative relationship between bad performance and 
the number of stages. This implies that an increase in the number of stages of one decreases 
the probability of bad performance by almost 20 percent. In the case of unknown performance 
there can be observed an increase of probability by almost 15 percent. Between good 
performance and the number of stages there is no significant relationship. 
This implies that a higher number of stages slightly improves the performance of venture 
capital-backed firms, but it does not increase the probability of good performance.  
  
                                                                              
numberstages     .1586487   .0690827     2.30   0.022     .0232492    .2940483
                                                                              
                    dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Delta-method
                                                                              
dy/dx w.r.t. : numberstages
Expression   : Pr(performance==Unknown), predict(outcome(3))
Model VCE    : OIM
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =        108
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5.7 Impact	of	Syndication	
 
As mentioned before, authors’ opinions about the definition of syndication vary a bit. Some 
talk about syndication when more than one venture capital firm invest simultaneously, others 
think that syndication also occurs when more than one investor provides money regardless of 
when.  
For this thesis I define syndication as the investment of more than one venture capitalist in 
one project independent from the close date. Again, the data does not tell us which 
investments have been syndicated. I took all firms that received money of two or more 
investors. This contains investments by more than one investor simultaneously, but also 
investments by several venture capitalists in different financing rounds. Another form is that 
the lead investor invested in the first round, and the others followed in the second round. Of 
course, it is not totally correct to say that all these investments are syndicated. Especially, if 
the investors operate in different stages they maybe never even spoke to each other.  
In order to be able to make a regression analysis I integrated a dummy variable for 
syndication, where 1 stands for syndication and 0 for non-syndication.  
Literature hardly mentions negative aspects of syndication. Therefore, I expected syndication 
to be very common.  
53.7 percent of all venture capital backed firms are financed by more than one venture 
capitalist. This shows that syndication is not unpopular. Out of these 58 cases of syndication 
38, almost two third, are of the type simultaneous. In 13 cases the fund investors follow in the 
second round and in seven cases the single investors seem to have nothing in common.  
 
Figure 17: Syndication 
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5.7.1 The	total	amount	of	money	invested	
 
Now, I want to analyze if there is a connection between syndication and the total amount of 
money invested. Syndication is the dependent variable and totalamount the independent. It 
can be expected that the total amount invested has a positive impact on syndication 
(hypothesis 4). Syndication is a dummy variable with 1 for syndication and 0 for non-
syndication and therefore categorical.  
 
Figure 18: The impact of the total amount invested on syndication 
 
The logistic regression shows that the logarithmic likelihood of syndication increases by 
0.514 when the total amount invested rises by one. As the p-level is equal to zero, the null 
hypothesis can be rejected. There is a positive relationship between syndication and total 
amount which verifies hypothesis 4. 
 
5.7.2 The	impact	of	syndication	on	performance	
 
As already analyzed for staging I also want to find out if there is a relationship between 
syndication and the current business status. Hypothesis 5 predicts that syndication increases 
the performance. As described before, the business status can be used to analyze if there is an 
improvement in performance. Syndication is a dummy variable and is the independent 
variable. Performance is the dependent variable and categorical with three categories. 
Furthermore, I introduced the same additional independent variables as with staging. I made a 
multinomial logistical regression.   
                                                                              
       _cons    -1.723648   .4340777    -3.97   0.000    -2.574425   -.8728718
 totalamount     .5144458   .1279286     4.02   0.000     .2637103    .7651813
                                                                              
 syndication        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -49.094877                       Pseudo R2       =     0.2841
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
                                                  LR chi2(1)      =      38.96
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =         99
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -49.094877  
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -49.094877  
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -49.097359  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -49.814525  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -56.051375  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -68.576109  
. logit syndication totalamount
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Again, there are only two significant relationships. There is a negative relationship between 
bad performance and syndication, which means that the probability of bad performance 
decreases when syndication occurs by almost 21 percent, while the probability of unknown 
performance increases by 22 percent. There are no further significant relationships.  
Syndication improves the performance of venture capital-backed firms in terms of a lower 
probability of bad performance. This partially confirms hypothesis 5.  
 
 
 
                                                                              
     startup    (omitted)
    shipping     .7836818   622.4982     0.00   0.999     -1219.29    1220.858
  profitable     3.160814   1485.706     0.00   0.998     -2908.77    2915.091
        beta    -.3815583    831.421    -0.00   1.000    -1629.937    1629.174
 development     .5597122   622.4982     0.00   0.999    -1219.514    1220.634
        seed    (omitted)
      second     .2379819   1134.341     0.00   1.000     -2223.03    2223.505
       later     1.014397   551.1415     0.00   0.999    -1079.203    1081.232
       first     1.020265   551.1415     0.00   0.999    -1079.197    1081.238
       other    (omitted)
          IT     1.690292   139.2542     0.01   0.990    -271.2428    274.6234
  Healthcare     1.769286   139.2542     0.01   0.990    -271.1639    274.7024
    Business     1.791074   139.2542     0.01   0.990    -271.1421    274.7242
 syndication     -.002088   .0647713    -0.03   0.974    -.1290373    .1248614
                                                                              
                    dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Delta-method
                                                                              
               startup
dy/dx w.r.t. : syndication Business Healthcare IT other first later second seed development beta profitable shipping
Expression   : Pr(performance==Good), predict(outcome(1))
Model VCE    : OIM
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =        105
                                                                              
     startup    (omitted)
    shipping    -2.571235   615.8183    -0.00   0.997    -1209.553     1204.41
  profitable    -3.366413   3794.366    -0.00   0.999    -7440.187    7433.454
        beta    -4.417829   864.1429    -0.01   0.996    -1698.107    1689.271
 development    -2.548562   615.8183    -0.00   0.997     -1209.53    1204.433
        seed    (omitted)
      second     4.763846   883.9942     0.01   0.996    -1727.833    1737.361
       later     1.866552   606.2266     0.00   0.998    -1186.316    1190.049
       first     1.725938   606.2266     0.00   0.998    -1186.456    1189.908
       other    (omitted)
          IT    -.4959286   52.09746    -0.01   0.992    -102.6051    101.6132
  Healthcare    -.6392572   52.09753    -0.01   0.990    -102.7485      101.47
    Business    -.5302778   52.09746    -0.01   0.992    -102.6394    101.5789
 syndication    -.2156008    .077249    -2.79   0.005     -.367006   -.0641955
                                                                              
                    dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Delta-method
                                                                              
               startup
dy/dx w.r.t. : syndication Business Healthcare IT other first later second seed development beta profitable shipping
Expression   : Pr(performance==Bad), predict(outcome(2))
Model VCE    : OIM
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =        105
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Figure 19: The impact of syndication on performance 
 
 
 
Figure 20: The impact of syndication on the business status 
 
                                                                              
     startup    (omitted)
    shipping     1.787553   567.7444     0.00   0.997    -1110.971    1114.546
  profitable     .2055986   3755.746     0.00   1.000    -7360.921    7361.332
        beta     4.799387   782.2155     0.01   0.995    -1528.315    1537.914
 development      1.98885   567.7444     0.00   0.997     -1110.77    1114.747
        seed    (omitted)
      second    -5.001827    1170.34    -0.00   0.997    -2298.825    2288.822
       later    -2.880949   538.0774    -0.01   0.996    -1057.493    1051.731
       first    -2.746202   538.0774    -0.01   0.996    -1057.359    1051.866
       other    (omitted)
          IT    -1.194364   87.15713    -0.01   0.989    -172.0192    169.6305
  Healthcare    -1.130029   87.15719    -0.01   0.990     -171.955    169.6949
    Business    -1.260796   87.15713    -0.01   0.988    -172.0856     169.564
 syndication     .2176887   .0810639     2.69   0.007     .0588063    .3765711
                                                                              
                    dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Delta-method
                                                                              
               startup
dy/dx w.r.t. : syndication Business Healthcare IT other first later second seed development beta profitable shipping
Expression   : Pr(performance==Unknown), predict(outcome(3))
Model VCE    : OIM
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =        105
                                                                              
     startup    (omitted)
    shipping    -3.039241   1271.205    -0.00   0.998    -2494.555    2488.476
  profitable    -3.765221   13097.54    -0.00   1.000    -25674.47    25666.94
        beta    -5.076002   1785.504    -0.00   0.998    -3504.599    3494.447
 development    -2.911137   1271.043    -0.00   0.998    -2494.109    2488.287
        seed    (omitted)
      second     5.382493   1734.286     0.00   0.998    -3393.756    3404.521
       later      2.40405   1254.528     0.00   0.998    -2456.425    2461.233
       first     2.140846   1254.181     0.00   0.999    -2456.009    2460.291
       other    (omitted)
          IT    -.5552925   107.7544    -0.01   0.996    -211.7501    210.6395
  Healthcare    -.5793116   110.0282    -0.01   0.996    -216.2306    215.0719
    Business    -.5901266   107.7544    -0.01   0.996     -211.785    210.6047
 syndication    -.2120711   .0768642    -2.76   0.006    -.3627222   -.0614201
                                                                              
                    dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Delta-method
                                                                              
               startup
dy/dx w.r.t. : syndication Business Healthcare IT other first later second seed development beta profitable shipping
Expression   : Pr(status==Out_of_Business), predict(outcome(2))
Model VCE    : OIM
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =        105
                                                                              
     startup    (omitted)
    shipping     1.058806   688.5766     0.00   0.999    -1348.527    1350.644
  profitable     .9126798   6202.363     0.00   1.000     -12155.5    12157.32
        beta     .6948047   935.7302     0.00   0.999    -1833.303    1834.692
 development     .5444823    683.939     0.00   0.999    -1339.951     1341.04
        seed    (omitted)
      second    -.8344806   1203.222    -0.00   0.999    -2359.107    2357.438
       later     -1.17596   654.9085    -0.00   0.999    -1284.773    1282.421
       first    -.6471244   644.5681    -0.00   0.999    -1263.977    1262.683
       other    (omitted)
          IT     .4442212   152.1655     0.00   0.998    -297.7948    298.6832
  Healthcare    -.0525809   175.5102    -0.00   1.000    -344.0463    343.9411
    Business     .4823113   152.1656     0.00   0.997    -297.7567    298.7213
 syndication     .0447543   .0386657     1.16   0.247    -.0310291    .1205376
                                                                              
                    dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Delta-method
                                                                              
               startup
dy/dx w.r.t. : syndication Business Healthcare IT other first later second seed development beta profitable shipping
Expression   : Pr(status==Publicly), predict(outcome(3))
Model VCE    : OIM
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =        105
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The result is not very surprising: The probability of out of business decreases by seven percent 
when syndication occurs. This relationship is significant. For publicly there is no significant 
relationship. Hypothesis 5a can only be partially confirmed. 
An interesting coincidence is that the results are very similar to those for the impact of 
staging. At this point, staging and syndication seem to influence to performance of venture 
capital-backed firms in a very similar way. 
Furthermore, I analyzed how the single types of syndication influence the performance or if 
there is a relationship at all. I look at the two most important types secondstage and 
simultaneous. Secondstage means that the syndication takes places in the second stage after 
the lead investor already invested one stage earlier. Simultaneous means that the investors 
provide money simultaneously at the same stage.  
The multinomial logistic regression analysis with performance as dependent and the two 
syndication types as independent variables does not point out any significant relationships. 
Thus, there seems to be no connection between the two factors. 
  
 
 
 
Figure 21: The impact of different syndication types on performance 
                                                                              
simultaneous    -.4667868   68.06123    -0.01   0.995    -133.8643    132.9308
 secondround    -.4720022    68.0613    -0.01   0.994    -133.8697    132.9257
                                                                              
                    dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Delta-method
                                                                              
dy/dx w.r.t. : secondround simultaneous
Expression   : Pr(performance==Good), predict(outcome(1))
Model VCE    : OIM
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =         58
                                                                              
simultaneous     2.080986   356.5888     0.01   0.995    -696.8203    700.9822
 secondround     2.053365   356.5888     0.01   0.995    -696.8479    700.9546
                                                                              
                    dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Delta-method
                                                                              
dy/dx w.r.t. : secondround simultaneous
Expression   : Pr(performance==Bad), predict(outcome(2))
Model VCE    : OIM
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =         58
                                                                              
simultaneous    -1.614199   288.5278    -0.01   0.996    -567.1183    563.8899
 secondround    -1.581363   288.5278    -0.01   0.996    -567.0855    563.9228
                                                                              
                    dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Delta-method
                                                                              
dy/dx w.r.t. : secondround simultaneous
Expression   : Pr(performance==Unknown), predict(outcome(3))
Model VCE    : OIM
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =         58
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Figure 22: Later syndication 
 
Furthermore, I looked at the variable latesynd I introduced. This variable points out whether 
new investors entered a venture capital deal after a syndication already occurred. As the 
number of latesynd is rather low – it only occurs in ten cases – a regression analysis does not 
make sense. Figure 22 shows that two of these cases experience good performance, while we 
do not know anything about the performance of the remaining eight firms. As a consequence, 
it is not possible to make a statement about the impact of this type of syndication on the 
performance of venture capital-backed firms in Austria.  
Besides, it is possible that the number of syndicated financing rounds has an impact on the 
performance of the firm. I counted the rounds in which a firm received money by more than 
one investor simultaneously. Of course, this analysis does not include the cases in which 
syndication occurs because of different venture capitalists investing in different stages. In this 
data there is a maximum of four syndicated rounds. Most firms (31 out of 108) that 
experienced syndication were financed by more than just one venture capitalist in only one 
round. 18 firms received the money in two rounds of more than one investor. Three or four 
rounds occur very rarely, each with one firm.  
The multinomial logistic regression analysis with performance as dependent and the number 
of rounds as independent variable shows two significant relationships. Again, these are the 
same as in the analyses before: There is a negative relationship with bad performance. The 
probability of bad performance decreases by 18 percent with every additional syndicated 
round. The probability of unknown performance increases by 16 percent. 
 
     Total          98         10         108 
                                             
   Unknown          52          8          60 
       Bad          30          0          30 
      Good          16          2          18 
                                             
         e           0          1       Total
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61 
 
 
 
 
Figure 23: The impact of the number of syndicated rounds on performance 
 
Interaction effects 
As I did already for staging, I now introduce some risk factors to see if the relationship 
between performance and syndication alters with other variables. 
Firstly, I looked at the firms that operate in the IT sector. There is only one significant p-value 
which points out a positive relationship between syndication and unknown performance. This 
does not tell a lot about the influence of being in this industry group on the investment 
behavior.  
 
 
 
 
                                                                              
  syndrounds     .0208652   .0398154     0.52   0.600    -.0571716    .0989019
                                                                              
                    dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Delta-method
                                                                              
dy/dx w.r.t. : syndrounds
Expression   : Pr(performance==Good), predict(outcome(1))
Model VCE    : OIM
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =        108
                                                                              
  syndrounds    -.1843727     .05923    -3.11   0.002    -.3004614    -.068284
                                                                              
                    dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Delta-method
                                                                              
dy/dx w.r.t. : syndrounds
Expression   : Pr(performance==Bad), predict(outcome(2))
Model VCE    : OIM
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =        108
                                                                              
  syndrounds     .1635075   .0559533     2.92   0.003     .0538411     .273174
                                                                              
                    dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Delta-method
                                                                              
dy/dx w.r.t. : syndrounds
Expression   : Pr(performance==Unknown), predict(outcome(3))
Model VCE    : OIM
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =        108
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Figure 24: The impact of syndiaction on the performance of firms in the IT sector 
 
Secondly, I took a sample of firms that received their first financing of a venture capitalist in 
the first round. Here, there is also a significant relationship between bad performance and 
syndication. The probability of bad performance decreases by 21 percent if syndication 
occurs. This is a much stronger impact on the performance than syndication has in all stages 
together. Consequently, syndication improves the performance of venture capital firms in 
Austria especially if the initial amount of money was provided in the first round. 
 
 
                                                                              
 syndication    -.0955688   .1002017    -0.95   0.340    -.2919606     .100823
                                                                              
                    dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Delta-method
                                                                              
dy/dx w.r.t. : syndication
Expression   : Pr(performance==Good), predict(outcome(1))
Model VCE    : OIM
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =         54
                                                                              
 syndication    -.1509232     .12129    -1.24   0.213    -.3886473    .0868008
                                                                              
                    dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Delta-method
                                                                              
dy/dx w.r.t. : syndication
Expression   : Pr(performance==Bad), predict(outcome(2))
Model VCE    : OIM
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =         54
                                                                              
 syndication      .246492   .1134879     2.17   0.030     .0240598    .4689243
                                                                              
                    dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Delta-method
                                                                              
dy/dx w.r.t. : syndication
Expression   : Pr(performance==Unknown), predict(outcome(3))
Model VCE    : OIM
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =         54
                                                                              
 syndication    -.0326939   .0744551    -0.44   0.661    -.1786231    .1132353
                                                                              
                    dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Delta-method
                                                                              
dy/dx w.r.t. : syndication
Expression   : Pr(performance==Good), predict(outcome(1))
Model VCE    : OIM
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =         91
                                                                              
 syndication    -.2140132   .0799356    -2.68   0.007    -.3706841   -.0573424
                                                                              
                    dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Delta-method
                                                                              
dy/dx w.r.t. : syndication
Expression   : Pr(performance==Bad), predict(outcome(2))
Model VCE    : OIM
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =         91
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Figure 25: The impact of syndication in the first round on the performance 
  
                                                                              
 syndication     .2467071   .0863391     2.86   0.004     .0774856    .4159286
                                                                              
                    dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Delta-method
                                                                              
dy/dx w.r.t. : syndication
Expression   : Pr(performance==Unknown), predict(outcome(3))
Model VCE    : OIM
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =         91
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5.8 Staging	and	Syndication	
 
Besides of the effect of staging and syndication as single measurements on the performance of 
venture capital-backed firms, it is also interesting to look at both factors together. In some 
firms not just one measure of those is introduced but both.  
There are 38 firms that neither experienced staging nor syndication. Twelve firms were 
financed in stages but by only one venture capitalist and 26 received money of syndicated 
investors in only one stage. 32 investments out of 108 were both, staged and syndicated. 
Although this means, that more firms did only experience one strategy than both, with 30 
percent a big part had the advantages and drawbacks of both methods. 
 
Figure 26: Syndication and staging 
 
5.8.1 The	impact	of	staging	and	syndication	on	performance	
 
I analyzed if there is a relationship between having experienced both strategies, staging and 
syndication, and the performance. For this, I did a multinomial logistic regression analysis 
with performance as dependent variable and stage, syndication and stage*syndication as 
explanatory ones. 
35%
11%24%
30%
Syndication and Staging
none
only staging
only syndication
both
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Figure 27: The impact of staging and syndication on performance 
 
The combination of both strategies to mitigate agency problems does not have the same 
significant relationships as if both are considered separately. There is no significant 
relationship with bad performance. Also for the other types of performance it cannot be said 
surely if there is a connection between the variables. 
This is a very surprising result because I expected an even stronger impact on the performance 
of venture capital-backed firms if syndication and staging occur in the same project.  
. 
  
                                                                              
  stagexsynd    -.1714391   .1474118    -1.16   0.245    -.4603609    .1174828
 syndication     .0807289   .0883872     0.91   0.361    -.0925068    .2539646
       stage     .0947587   .1100156     0.86   0.389    -.1208679    .3103853
                                                                              
                    dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Delta-method
                                                                              
dy/dx w.r.t. : stage syndication stagexsynd
Expression   : Pr(performance==Good), predict(outcome(1))
Model VCE    : OIM
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =        108
                                                                              
  stagexsynd    -.0073269   .1867471    -0.04   0.969    -.3733444    .3586906
 syndication    -.1930391   .0930835    -2.07   0.038    -.3754794   -.0105988
       stage       -.1728    .126583    -1.37   0.172    -.4208981    .0752981
                                                                              
                    dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Delta-method
                                                                              
dy/dx w.r.t. : stage syndication stagexsynd
Expression   : Pr(performance==Bad), predict(outcome(2))
Model VCE    : OIM
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =        108
                                                                              
  stagexsynd     .1787659   .1975666     0.90   0.366    -.2084575    .5659894
 syndication     .1123101   .1127063     1.00   0.319    -.1085902    .3332104
       stage     .0780412   .1480564     0.53   0.598    -.2121439    .3682264
                                                                              
                    dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Delta-method
                                                                              
dy/dx w.r.t. : stage syndication stagexsynd
Expression   : Pr(performance==Unknown), predict(outcome(3))
Model VCE    : OIM
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =        108
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5.9 Summary	
 
The results of my empirical study are not very surprising. The hypotheses developed in the 
theoretical part of this paper have been mostly confirmed.  
Unexpected for me was that there are no significant relationships between the total amount 
invested and the firm performance. This indicates that venture capital does not have an 
especially great impact on performance. Of course, I have no access to data of firms that did 
not receive any venture capital and consequently no possibility to compare venture capital-
backed firm with others. Therefore, it is not possible to totally withdraw a connection between 
the venture capital and performance. A possible explanation is that venture capitalists add a 
lot of value to the firm by advising and supporting the management. Thus, the performance of 
the firm is not necessarily dependent on the amount invested but on other factors as well.  
The methods staging and syndication brought up some surprises but most hypotheses were 
confirmed at least partially. Staging does not occur that often in venture capital deals as I 
would have expected because of its advantages. Syndication is more popular, which could be 
because of the missing drawbacks. Staging involves certain disadvantages while syndication 
hardly has any. Syndication occurs more often than staging, what could signify that venture 
capitalists in Austria need partners to provide the needed capital and that they want to reduce 
the risk involved. This assumption is strengthened by the finding that syndication occurs more 
often the higher the amount of money invested is. 
It has been shown that in most cases staging just consists of two stages, which is the minimum 
possible amount. This can be explained by the costs caused by additional stages. This 
strengthens my assumption that the existing disadvantages of staging play an important role 
when deciding for or against it. In the case of syndication there is no distinction between the 
number of stages but between the timing of syndication. In most cases the syndication took 
place simultaneously, but this is not of importance for the performance of venture capital-
backed firms. 
This leads me to the main point of my empirical study. The main question was if syndication 
and staging have an impact on the performance of venture capital-backed firm. It was 
expected to have a positive impact, not only because this was supposed by literature but also 
because methods to mitigate agency problems should improve the deal, and consequently, the 
performance of the firm. However, there is a positive relationship between syndication and 
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performance, as well as between staging and performance. The fact that staging and 
syndication improve the performance at least a bit, shows that venture capital indeed has a 
positive effect on the firm performance. The interesting thing is that the results for both 
strategies are very similar. In both cases, the positive relationship is not very strong. Looking 
at the performance the relationship is only significant for bad and unknown performance. Bad 
performance tells us a lot, while unknown performance does not. Good performance which 
would provide us more information has no significant relationships with staging or 
syndication. Therefore it cannot be said that the performance improves a lot, but the 
probability of bad performance decreases in both cases by about a quarter. This of course also 
implies a better performance. Syndication has hardly disadvantages, which made it very 
unsurprisingly that it improves the performance. The effect could have been a bit stronger, but 
nevertheless it withdraws the idea of To Huy and Jaeger that syndication has no positive 
effect on performance. However, staging has also a positive effect on the performance of 
venture capital-backed firms in Austria. It does not occur that often as expected which 
possibly can be explained by the disadvantages it involves. Especially the costs of staging 
could discourage the investors. The improvement of performance shows that the advantages 
overtop the drawbacks.  
 Surprisingly, both strategies combined have no significant relationship with firm 
performance. It could have been expected that these firms take advantage of the positive 
effects of both strategies. Consequently, the improvement in performance should have been 
even stronger.  
To sum up, the amount of money invested alone does not improve the performance of venture 
capital-backed firms in Austria. The improvement is made by the strategies that mitigate 
agency problems that usually occur within venture capital deals. Hence, it can be said that 
agency problems hinder venture capitalists from reaching a positive result. If these problems 
can be mitigated, venture capital is a financing method that enhances the entrepreneur’s 
chances to succeed.  
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6. Conclusion	
 
Venture capital in Europe is becoming more important and some European countries already 
seem to choose this financing form as often as or even more often than the United States. I 
analyzed the current situation in Austria. The main question of this thesis was whether a 
relationship between venture capital and firm performance exists.  
International literature highlights different aspect of venture capital and authors developed 
various theories with different outcomes. However, the biggest part of academic research 
points out a positive impact of venture capital on firm performance. The same is true for the 
specific methods to mitigate agency problems staging and syndication. Unfortunately, there is 
hardly any information available about the current situation in Austria. There are already 
some papers about venture capital in Europe, but the range is still very limited. Because of 
this, I had to base most of the theory on American literature. 
After developing some hypotheses based on the available literature on venture capital, I did an 
empirical study in order to confirm or withdraw them. The hypotheses suggested that venture 
capital in general has a very positive impact on the performance of the financed firms. In most 
cases my assumptions could be confirmed.  
Generally, it can be expected that venture capital improves the performance of a firm. I draw 
the conclusion that the firm performance should increase with the amount invested by the 
venture capitalist, which I was not able to confirm. This may be due to my choice of the 
dependent variable. Besides of the capital invested, the venture capitalists also provide 
advises and support to the management. This also influences the performance of the firm. 
Unfortunately, I have no access to information about the impact of these factors. Anyway, this 
is a point which still can be analyzed and maybe lead to other results or even the confirmation 
of the hypothesis that venture capital improves firm performance. Another point here, which 
could be altered in further studies, is the measurement of performance. I decided to use the 
exit strategy or the current status of business as indicator for firm performance. Of course, 
there would also be the possibility to look on the firm value in numbers instead. This even 
makes it easier to look at the impact of venture capital and also points out slighter differences. 
Unfortunately, those numbers were not available for me. 
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The results for staging and syndication were not very surprising and indicate a positive impact 
of venture capital on performance. But of course there are still other factors which can be 
analyzed. One possibility would be to use a different definition of staging and syndication. As 
mentioned in the thesis my way is not the only one. But I think that this would not change the 
outcome significantly. Furthermore, it would be interesting to have more knowledge about the 
motives of choosing these strategies. In my thesis I mainly looked at the consequences but not 
on the reason, except for those mentioned in the theoretical part. However, I did not test 
whether the motives in Austria are the same. Again, there would be more data about the firms 
and deals needed. 
To put it in a nutshell, venture capital is a very broad topic which was not paid a lot of 
attention in Austria yet. There are still a lot of question which have to be answered, especially 
for Europe and Austria. One big problem here is the missing information which makes it 
difficult to analyze the real consequences of venture capital on the performance of venture 
capital-backed firms. However, my results point out that venture capital does work in Austria 
as well even if the proofed impact on the firm performance is not very strong.  
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Appendices	
	
Appendix	A:	Abstract	
 
The importance of venture capital has increased over time. At the moment the venture capital 
market which is especially interesting for start-up firms grows in the United States. European 
venture capital funds still cannot compete with Americans. This thesis focuses on the 
investment behavior and its consequences for the firm performance in Austria. The theoretical 
part discusses in detail how venture capital works and what agency problems can arise within 
this financing form. International literature already proposes lots of methods to mitigate them. 
Two methods which are discussed very detailed, both theoretically and within the empirical 
study, are staging and syndication. These play an important role for venture capital deals. 
Based on data of 183 Austrian firms that received venture capital it is analyzed how venture 
capital in general and specific strategies to mitigate agency problems influence the firm 
performance. Because of the findings of international literature it can be assumed that venture 
capital improves the performance of venture capital backed firms, as well as staging and 
syndication lead to better results. The empirical study of this paper confirms this only partially 
for the special case of Austria. A significant relationship between venture capital and the firm 
performance has not been found. But it has been proven that staging and syndication improve 
the firm performance indeed. Besides of these main effects also the general features of 
venture capital deals in Austria have been examined.  
 
Appendix	B:	Abstract	(German)	
 
Venture-Capital (auch Risiko- oder Beteiligungskapitel genannt) hat im Laufe der Zeit immer 
mehr an Bedeutung gewonnen. Momentan wächst der Markt für Venture-Capital in den 
Vereinigten Staaten, welcher besonders für Start-up Unternehmen interessant ist. Europäische 
Venture-Capital-Fonds können noch nicht mit Amerikanischen mithalten. Diese 
Magisterarbeit konzentriert sich auf das Investmentverhalten und seine Auswirkungen auf das 
Unternehmensergebnis. Im theoretischen Teil wird detailliert erörtert, wie Venture-Capital 
funktioniert und welche Vertretungsprobleme mit dieser Finanzierungsform auftreten können. 
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Die internationale Literatur schlägt bereits einige Methoden vor, um diese zu verringern. Zwei 
Methoden, auf welche besonders genau eingegangen wird, sind staging (stufenweise 
Finanzierung) und Syndizierung. Diese spielen eine bedeutende Rolle in Venture-Capital. 
Basierend auf Daten von 183 österreichischen Firmen, die Venture-Capital erhielten, wird 
analysiert wie Venture-Capital generell und spezifische Strategien innerhalb dieses 
Investment, die Vertretungsprobleme lösen sollen, das Unternehmensergebnis beeinflussen. 
Aufgrund der Erkenntnisse internationale Literatur kann angenommen werden, dass Venture-
Capital das Ergebnis von Unternehmen verbessert, so wie auch staging und Syndizierung zu 
besseren Ergebnissen führen.  Die empirische Studie dieser Arbeit bestätigt dies für 
Österreich nur teilweise. Es konnte kein signifikanter Zusammenhang zwischen Venture-
Capital und dem Unternehmensergebnis festgestellt werden. Aber es wurde bewiesen, dass 
staging und Syndizierung in der Tat zu einem besseren Unternehmensergebnis führen. Neben 
diesen Haupteffekten wurden auch generelle Eigenschaften der Venture-Capital-Geschäfte in 
Österreich untersucht. 
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